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ROBERT R. KUEHN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It has often been said that a right without a remedy is no right at all. Even with a 
remedy, in most situations, enforcing or defending a legal right requires the 
assistance of an attorney. Complex legal rules, stringent procedural requirements, 
and an adversarial system that functions best when both sides are represented by 
competent attorneys leave the unrepresented at a substantial, and in most situations 
insurmountable, disadvantage. As the Supreme Court observed, "Even the intelligent 
and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law"! Thus, 
one reason for the popular observation that only a fool would have himself as a 
client. 
The absence of an attorney can be especially hard on the poor. Many lower­
income people rely on government programs to obtain essential human needs,2 
making their reliance on the law and its enforcement greater than for more affluent 
citizens.3 One commentator argued, "[i]t seems self-evident that the poor ... and 
other disadvantaged are ... more likely to suffer distress and injustice than those 
better off.',4 As a consequence, the poor are more likely to need the assistance of the 
judicial system to address those wrongs. In addition, lower-income persons likely 
encounter greater geographical, literacy, cultural, and language barriers just to access 
the justice system, much less to use the system successfully. All of these factors 
* Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. The author thanks Jennifer 
Shea for her research assistance. 
1 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). 
2 LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT 
UNMET CWIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 1 (2005) [hereinafter LSC 
REPORT]. 
3 Deborah M. Weissman, Law as Largess: Shifting Paradigms ofLaw for the Poor, 44 
WM. & MARY L. REv. 737, 750 (2002). As a legal needs study found, "[1]egal problems 
experienced by low-income people are substantially more likely [than moderate-income 
people] to relate to family safety (including domestic violence), economic security, housing 
and other basic needs." TASK FORCE ON CNIL EQUAL JUSTICE FuNDING, WASH. STAlE 
SUPREME COURT, THE WASHINGTON STAlE CWIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 37 (2003), available 
at http://www.courts.wa.govInewsinfo/contentltaskforce/CivilLegalNeeds.pdf [hereinafter 
WASH. STUDY]. 
4 JOEL F. HANDIER, THE CONDmONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, 
BUREAUCRACY 24 (1986). 
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come together to produce a perverse result-those most in need of legal assistance 
must overcome the greatest obstacles to obtain that assistance. 
Congress recognized the important role legal assistance plays in protecting the 
poor when it declared the need "to provide equal access to the system of justice in 
our Nation for individuals who seek redress of grievances" and created the Legal 
Services Corporation ("LSC") to provide "high quality legal assistance to those who 
would otherwise be unable to afford adequate legal counsel."s More recently, the 
president of the American Bar Association ("ABA") called on the legal profession to 
"make good, finally, on the promise of equal justice-and equal access to justice­
for all Americans ... [and] consider providing such a right [to counsell-as many 
nations of the world already have-for serious civil matters that threaten the 
integrity of one's family, shelter or health.,,6 In sum, the American ideal of equal 
justice under law, described by a former Supreme Court Justice as "perhaps the most 
inspiring ideal of our society,,,7 requires equal access to legal representation. 
Yet, study after study has documented the wide gap between legal needs and 
the availability of an attorney, especially for the poor. A 1994 ABA study found that 
lower-income households averaged approximately one civil legal need each year, yet 
only about one in four were able to address the need through the civil justice 
system.8 A number of recent state legal needs studies similarly found that fewer than 
twenty percent of the legal problems experienced by low-income people are 
5 Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2000). 
6 Michael S. Greco, Address to the American Bar Association House of Delegates, 16 
PROF. LAW. 1, 4 (2005); see also TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE, ABA, REPORT TO 
THE HOUSE OF DELEGAlES No. 112A, at 1 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
legalservices/sclaidldownloads/06AI12A.pdf (urging federal and state governments ''to 
provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low income persons in . . . 
proceedings where basic human needs are at stake"). 
7 Francis J. Larkin, The Legal Services Corporation Must Be Saved, JUDGES' J., Winter 
1995, at 1, 1 ("Equal justice under law is not merely a caption on the facade of the Supreme 
Court building. It is perhaps the most inspiring ideal of our society . . . . It is fundamental that 
justice should be the same, in substance and availability, without regard to economic status." 
(quoting Justice Lewis Powell, Jr.)). Judge Learned Hand once said: "If we are to keep 
democracy, there must be one commandment: Thou shalt not ration justice." Karen A. Lash et 
aI., Equal Access to Civil Justice: Pursuing Solutions Beyond the Legal Profession, 17 YALE 
L. & POL'y REv. 489, 501 & n.39 (1998) (quoting from Judge Hand's February 16, 1951 
address to the Legal Aid Society of New York); see also Robert A. Katzmann, Themes in 
Context, in THE LAW FIRM AND THE PuBUC GoOD 1, 6 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1995) 
("[A]ccess to minimal legal services is necessary for access to the legal system, and without 
access to the legal system, there is no equality before the law. The lawyer becomes the critical 
medium by which access to that legal system and the concomitant opportunity to secure justice 
is achieved."). 
8 CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVS. & THE PuB., ABA, LEGAL NEEDS AND CIVIL JUSTICE, 
A SURVEY OF AMERICANS: MAJOR FINDINGS FROM THE COMPREHENSNE LEGAL NEEDS 
STUDY 11,23 (1994). 
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addressed with the assistance of an attorney.9 According to one study, nine out of ten 
low-income households that get no attorney assistance end up receiving no help at 
all; among the ten percent that try to get other help, most tum to community 
organizations that cannot provide legal assistance.10 
One reason poor people experience a large percentage of unmet legal needs is 
that so few attorneys are available for the poor. Although one in seven Americans 
lives in poverty, only one percent of attorneys are dedicated to serving the legal 
needs of the poor. 11 "[T]here is about one lawyer for every 240 non-poor Americans, 
but only one lawyer for every 9,000 Americans whose low income would qualify for 
civil legal aid.,,12 As former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor observed: 
While lawyers have much we can be proud of, we also have a great 
deal to be ashamed of in terms of how we are responding to the needs of 
people who can't afford to pay our services .... [T]here has probably 
never been a wider gulf between the need for legal services and the 
availability of legal services.13 
Individual attorneys and local, state, and national bar assocIatIons have 
recognized this serious problem and have made significant efforts to provide free 
legal assistance to those unable to afford the services of an attorney. A recent ABA 
pro bono survey found that sixty percent "of respondents provided free legal services 
to persons of limited means" and one-third provided free services to organizations 
that "serve the poor.,,14 Of those attorneys doing pro bono work, the average attorney 
provided twenty-seven hours per year to people of limited means and twelve hours 
per year to organizations serving the poor.15 Yet overall, "[a]ccording to the best 
estimates available, the profession as a whole provides less than half an hour per 
9 LSC REPORT, supra note 2, at 9 (reporting the results of studies from 2000 through 
2005 in Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, Tennessee, 
Vermont, and Washington); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting 
Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 371 (2004) ("According to most 
estimates, about four-fifths of the civil legal needs of low income individuals ... remain 
unmet."). 
10 WASH. STUDY, supra note 3, at 49.
 
11 Rhode, supra note 9, at 371.
 
12 David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public Interest
 
wwyers, 91 CAL. L. REv. 209, 211 (2003). 
13 Katzmann, supra note 7, at 2 (containing excerpt from Justice O'Connor's Pro Bono 
Work-Good News and Bad News speech at the ABA's 1991 Annual Meeting in Atlanta, 
Georgia). 
14 STANDING COMM. ON PRo BONO & PuB. SERV., ABA, SUPPORTING JUSTICE: A 
REPORT ON THE PRo BONO WORK OF AMERICA'S LAWYERS 11 (2005), available at http:// 
www.abanet.org/legalservices/probono/report.pdf [hereinafter SUPPORTING JUSTICE]. 
15 Id. at 12-13. 
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week of assistance to the poor.,,16 In addition, Professor Deborah Rhode argues that 
of the pro bono work that is done, most is donated to friends, relatives, or matters 
designed to help attract paying clients. I? Unpopular clients and causes are usually 
avoided, in particular by law firms not wanting to offend paying clients.18 Moreover, 
lengthy, complex cases that may provide significant benefits to large groups of the 
poor are unlikely to be handled by a private lawyer working pro bono.19 
Despite the acknowledged importance of legal representation and widespread 
unmet legal needs of the poor, Congress has imposed significant restrictions on the 
types of indigent clients and cases that LSC attorneys may represent, as well as 
restrictions on how eligible cases may be handled.20 These restrictions on access to 
legal representation have been criticized by the ABA and some state bar associations 
as contrary to the ideals of equal justice and principles of the legal profession.21 
Notwithstanding this criticism, attorneys and bar associations have similarly 
restricted the assistance available to the poor through a number of civil legal 
assistance programs. In some situations, attorneys and bar associations have 
purposefully chosen to deny free legal assistance to certain unpopular clients or 
16 Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 283, 291 
(1998); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Pursuit ofthe Public Good: Access to Justice in the 
United States, 7 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 1, 11 (2001) ("Most troubling. after growth in pro 
bono activity during the 1980s, the trend in the last years of the twentieth century was 
backward: The average attorney at the wealthiest 100 firms in the United States dedicated one­
third less time to pro bono work in 1999 than in 1992."); Lua Kamal Yuille, Note, No One's 
Perfect (Not Even Close): Reevaluating Access to Justice in the United States and Western 
Europe, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 863, 902--03 (2004) ("[N]ationally, various estimates 
indicate that between 50% and 93% of lawyers do not perform any pro bono work at al1."). 
17 Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for Lawyers and Law 
Students, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2415, 2423 (1999); see also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODEL 
LEGAL ErnICS § 16.9 (1986) (observing that what some lawyers call pro bono often advances 
new client development, seeks to create goodwill with judges and other attorneys, or consists 
of volunteer work for bar committees but does not address the legal needs of the poor); 
Carolyn Elefant, Can Law Firms Do Pro Bono? A Skeptical View of Law Firms' Pro Bono 
Programs, 16 J. LEGAL PROF. 95, 102--03 (1991) (arguing that some law fmns use pro bono 
work to develop profitable business contacts). 
18 See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1, 61-62 
(1988); Norman W. Spaulding, The Prophet and the Bureaucrat: Positional Conflicts in 
Service Pro Bono Publico, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1395, 1418, 1420 (1998). 
19 See Esther F. Lardent, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: The Wrong Answer to the 
Right Question, 49 MD. L. REv. 78, 91-92 (1990) (arguing that volunteer lawyer programs 
focus on simple matters and cases not addressing mainstream poverty issues). 
20 See infra Part II. 
21 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Ope 399 (1996) 
[hereinafter Formal Ope 399] (discussing the ethical obligations of lawyers who receive LSC 
money and how ideally there would be no restrictions at all); Ass'n of the Bar of the City of 
N.Y., A Call for the Repeal or Invalidation of Congressional Restrictions on Legal Services 
Lawyers, 53 REc. ASS'NBAR CITY N.Y. 13 (1998). 
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causes, or prohibit attorneys for the poor from using the same legal tools available to 
attorneys for private clients. In other situations, attorneys and bar associations have 
unwittingly imposed restrictions on the recipients of funds intended to expand access 
to free legal assistance. 
This Article analyzes the complicity of lawyers in restricting the availability of 
legal assistance to low-income people. Part II examines the restrictions imposed by 
Congress on the availability of free legal assistance for the poor and their effects on 
access to justice. Part ill chronicles the role the legal profession has played in 
imposing similar restrictions on lawyer-financed or -sponsored legal assistance 
programs for the poor.22 Part N considers the professional implications of the 
profession's role in restricting access to legal representation and making it more 
difficult for some unpopular clients and causes to obtain justice. Finally, Part V 
concludes that individual attorneys, judges, and organized bar associations must 
consider the extent to which their programs and policies restrict the ability of some 
unpopular clients and causes to gain access to justice and must actively remove these 
restrictions. 
II. CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
The LSC funding is the largest single source of funding for civil legal 
assistance for the poor, providing over $291 million in 2005.23 However, through 
regulations and appropriations governing the LSC, Congress has imposed severe 
restrictions on access to legal representation for lower-income persons. Ideally, 
Congress would have formulated restrictions based on an analysis of the most 
important legal needs of the poor, but it did not. Instead, the restrictions are political 
choices reflecting congressional disapproval of certain unpopular clients or causes. 
A. Restrictions on Unpopular Clients 
As originally passed in 1974, the Legal Services Corporation Act ("LSC Act") 
did not deny assistance to any class of persons, other than to limit eligibility to those 
unable to afford legal assistance.24 Beginning in 1980, Congress adopted restrictions 
on the use of LSC funds for representing certain aliens, and expanded these 
22 In focusing on legal assistance programs, this Article does not address the contention 
that the bar has denied access to legal assistance by fighting for restraints on the ability of 
nonlawyers to provide assistance on routine legal matters. See Deborah L. Rhode, Equal 
Justice Under Law: Connecting Principle to Practice, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 47,60-61 
(2003). 
23 PROJECT TO ExpAND RESOURCES FOR LEGAL SERVS. (PERLS), ABA, A CHART OF 
SIGNIFICANT FuNDRAISING ACTIVITIES FOR LEGAL SERVICES, 2005 UPDAlE (2006) 
[hereinafter PERLS CHART]; E-mail from Meredith McBurney, ABA PERLS, to author (July 
17,2006) (on file with author). 
24 Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2000)) [hereinafter LSC Act]. 
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restrictions in 1983 and 1996 at the urging of farmers upset about migrant farm 
workers litigating for back wages.25 Today, a number of categories of aliens residing 
in the United States, including many who are in the country legally, are ineligible for 
free legal assistance from funds appropriated by Congress.26 Thus, LSC grantees are 
prohibited from representing not only undocumented or illegal aliens, but also many 
legal aliens, including some workers recruited into the country under special work 
visas and individuals on temporary visas, such as student visas.27 In addition, under 
the 1996 restrictions, recipients of LSC funds cannot even represent these excluded 
categories of aliens with non-LSC funds, such as private or state-appropriated 
funds.28 Because of the lack of non-LSC-funded legal services, aliens in some areas 
of the country are now effectively shut off from free legal assistance programs.29 
25 Alan W. Houseman, Restrictions by Funders and the Ethical Practice of Law, 67 
FORDHAM L. REv. 2187, 2194 (1999). The most stringent restrictions on LSC funds were 
imposed by Congress in 1996 with the enactment of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions 
and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 [hereinafter LSC 
Appropriations Act]. These restrictions have been renewed by Congress in each subsequent 
LSC appropriation. See Pub. L. No. 109-108, 119 Stat. 2290 (2006); Pub. L. No. 108-447, 
118 Stat. 2809 (2005); Pub. L. No. 108-199,118 Stat. 3 (2004); Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 
11 (2003); Pub. L. No. 107-77, 115 Stat. 748 (2001); Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 
(2000); Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999); Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 
(1998); Pub. L. No. 105-119, 111 Stat. 2440 (1997). 
26 LSC Appropriations Act § 504(a)(11); 45 C.F.R. §§ 1626.1 to .12 (2005). David Pai 
explained Congress's motivation for denying legal assistance to certain aliens: 
Lobbyists sent wave after wave of complaints from private, individual farmers to 
testify about their business losses resulting from migrant farm workers who 
litigated for back wages. Ultimately, the farmers and their lobbyists convinced 
members of Congress that appropriating funds to be used by noncitizens against a 
sizeable voting constituency verged on political suicide. 
David Pai, When Congress Gives You Lemons: Alternatives to Legal Services Corporation 
Funding in the Quest to Provide Access to Justice, 2 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY LJ. 83, 88 
(2004). 
27 Laura K. Abel & David S. Udell, /fYou Gag the Lawyers, Do You Choke the Courts? 
Some Implications for Judges when Funding Restrictions Curb Advocacy by Lawyers on 
Behalfofthe Poor, 29 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 873,878 & n.15 (2002); Laura K. Abel & Risa E. 
Kaufman, Preserving Aliens' and Migrant Workers' Access to Civil Legal Services: 
Constitutional and Policy Considerations, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 491, 496--97 (2003). 
28 LSC Appropriations Act § 504(d)(1) ("[N]o recipient [of LSC funds] shall accept 
funds from any source other than the Corporation, unless the Corporation or the recipient, as 
the case may be, notifies in writing the source of the funds that the funds may not be expended 
for any purpose prohibited by the Legal Services Corporation Act or this title."); 45 C.F.R. §§ 
1610.1 to .9 (2005). 
29 Abel & Kaufman, supra note 27, at 497; David S. Udell, The Legal Services 
Restrictions: Lawyers in Florida, New York, Virginia, and Oregon Describe the Costs, 17 
YALEL. &PoL'yREv. 337,359 (1998). 
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Denying aliens access to legal representation cannot be defended on the ground that 
aliens lack legal rights. Commentators have noted that "[bloth legal and 
undocumented aliens in this country are generally entitled to the same legal 
protections as everyone else.,,3o Hence, rights under the Equal Protection Clause, 
labor laws, employment discrimination statutes, and workers' compensation 
programs generally extend to undocumented workers?1 As the Supreme Court 
explained in 1896, because an alien owes obedience to the laws of the country where 
residing, that person is therefore entitled to the equal protection of those laws.32 
Nor can a restriction on access to legal representation for aliens be explained by 
a lack of need for assistance. Undocumented aliens are often particularly vulnerable 
to workplace exploitation because of the fear that if they seek to enforce legal rights 
their employers may retaliate by assisting with their deportation. Moreover, language 
barriers, lack of familiarity with the legal system, geographical isolation, and 
dependency on employers for food and housing make even legal aliens vulnerable to 
exploitation and being cut off from legal assistance.33 
Although the denial of legal assistance to undocumented aliens might seem 
satisfactory to those concerned with illegal immigration, legal residents of the United 
States may well be harmed by denying undocumented or illegal aliens access to 
attorneys. Because illegal workers are largely shut out of the legal system, employers 
who hire illegal aliens learn that those employees are unable to challenge unlawful 
employment practices or conditions, unlike employees who are able to access legal 
aid. An attorney for legal services in Florida observed that this denial of access to 
legal representation has encouraged employers seeking to evade enforcement of 
worker protection laws to favor illegal aliens over legal workers with access to 
attorneys and the justice system.34 
Prisoners are similarly unpopular with Congress. In 1996, Congress passed a 
broad prohibition on civil litigation by LSC attorneys on behalf of an incarcerated 
30 Abel & Kaufman, supra note 27, at 500. 
31 Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace 
Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 407,415-16 (1995) 
(noting that undocumented workers are protected by the Fair Labor Standards Act, the 
National Labor Relations Act, employment discrimination statutes, and workers' 
compensation regimes). 
32 Wing v. lTnited States, 163 U.S. 228, 242--43 (1896) (Field, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) ("A resident, alien born, is entitled to the same protection under the laws 
that a citizen is entitled to. He owes obedience to the laws of the country in which he is 
domiciled, and, as a consequence, he is entitled to the equal protection of those laws . . . in 
face of the great constitutional amendment which declares that no State shall deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). 
33 Abel & Kaufman, supra note 27, at 494; Sudha Shetty, Equal Justice Under the Law: 
Myth or Reality for Immigrants and Refugees?, 2 SEATILEJ. Soc. JUST. 565,566-67 (2004). 
34 See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, HIDDEN AGENDAS: WHAT Is REAlLY BEHIND 
AITACKS ON LEGAL AID LAWYERS? 11 (2001), available at http://www.brennancenter.org! 
dynamic/subpages/atj7.pdf. 
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35 person. Although the LSC funding restriction was prompted by objections to 
litigation over jail conditions, it broadly prohibits representation even if the potential 
client has not been convicted of a crime and extends to any civil case, even unrelated 
cases that may have arisen prior to the incarceration.36 Professor Deborah Rhode 
contends that this unavailability contributes to a belief among prison employees that 
they will not be held accountable for sexual abuse of inmates.37 
Congress also deems persons charged with drug crimes, even where they have 
not yet been convicted, unworthy of legal representation in any eviction proceeding 
brought by a public housing agency because the illegal drug activity allegedly 
threatens health or safety.38 
The goal of Congress in enacting these restrictions was summarized by a 
congressman during the debate over the 1996 restrictions: to stop "unpopular 
individuals [from bringing] unpopular lawsuits" through the LSC.39 The result is that 
significant numbers of aliens, prisoners, and persons charged with drug crimes lack 
access to civil legal services.4o By forcing many poor persons to appear in court 
proceedings pro se, the restrictions also increase burdens on judges and courtS.41 
B. Restrictions on Unpopular Causes 
If Congress deems aliens, prisoners, and those charged with drug crimes 
"unpopular individuals," then it deems efforts to enforce rights relating to abortion, 
redistricting, desegregation, and selective service as "unpopular lawsuits" that the 
poor ought not to bring with federally filnded attorneys. Thus, in adopting the LSC 
Act in 1974, Congress prohibited the use of funds to provide legal assistance to low­
income persons for any proceeding relating to school desegregation, abortion, or a 
35 LSC Appropriations Act § 504(a)(15); 45 C.F.R. §§ 1637.1 to.5 (2005). 
36 Abel & Udell, supra note 27, at 878-79; Udell, supra note 29, at 360-61. 
37 Deborah L. Rhode, Rape in Prison: Indifference Rules, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 29, 2001, at 
A25. 
38 LSC Appropriations Act § 504(a)(17); 45 C.F.R. §§ 1633.1 to .4 (2005). 
39 142 CONGo REc. 13, 18630 (1996) (statement of Rep. Schiff) (characterizing 
arguments against actions of LSC grantees). A Senate report on the 1996 LSC Act objected 
that LSC grantees "continue to represent plaintiffs in cases that the vast majority of Americans 
do not support." S. REp. No. 104-392, at 3 (1996). 
40 See Abel & Udell, supra note 27, at 875 n.3 (listing reports on the effects of the 
federal restrictions); Abel & Kaufman, supra note 27, at 497-98; Laurence E. Norton, IT, Not 
Too Much Justicefor the Poor, 101 DICK. L. REv. 601, 608--09 (1997). 
41 Drew A. Swank, In Defense ofRules and Roles: The Need to Curb Extreme Forms of 
Pro Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U. L. REv. 1537, 1548 (2005) 
(''The increase in pro se litigation has disrupted the efficiency of the courts, causing courtroom 
delays and overburdening judges, attorneys, and court staff."). 
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violation of the Military Selective Service Act.42 Those restrictions continue today, 
joined in 1996 by a new congressional restriction on advocating or opposing any 
legislative, judicial, or elective redistricting plan.43 
As with the client restrictions, Congress did not base these prohibitions on an 
assessment of the legal needs of the poor, the costs and benefits of such 
representation, or the availability of alternate sources of legal assistance. Rather, 
critics note the restrictions reflected the displeasure of certain members of Congress 
with court decisions or successful lawyering by advocates for the poor. For example, 
a representative critical of the role of a legal services grantee in a Detroit 
desegregation case introduced the restriction on school desegregation cases.44 The 
stated purpose for denying assistance relating to a poor person's constitutional right 
to an abortion was to respond to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Roe v. 
Wade.45 As one commentator noted, "the legislative history surrounding the 
restrictions ... reveals a clear congressional intent to 'punish' advocates" of these 
disfavored causes.46 
Proponents claimed the restrictions would "de-politicize" legal services lawyers 
by removing them from controversial cases. However, it is not political for a lawyer 
to assist a poor person in enforcing or defending legal rights, as that is what lawyers 
do every day, without objection, for paying clients. In addition, access to legal 
assistance and the courts is often necessary to balance the power of the legislative 
and executive branches and to ensure that constitutional and legislatively created 
rights are equally available to the rich and poor. As one senator explained in 
rebutting charges that providing legal assistance was improperly political: "When 
migrant workers and other poor individuals assert their legal rights, they can offend 
42 LSC Act § 1OO7(b)(7)-(9) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996(t)(8)-(10) 
(2000)); 45 C.F.R. § 1610.2(a)(7)-(9) (2005); see Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 451-71a (2000). 
43 See LSC Appropriations Act § 504(a)(1); 45 C.F.R. § 1610.2(b)(1) (2005). 
44 Warren E. George, Development of the Legal Services Corporation, 61 CORNELL L. 
REv. 681, 697 n.115 (1976) (noting that the restriction was introduced by a representative who 
had focused on the role of the Center for Law and Education in the Detroit school 
desegregation case of Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972)). 
45 Id. at 697 n.116 (noting that one of Representative Hogan's stated purposes in adding 
the restriction on abortion was "to 'respond' to the 'shocking' Supreme Court decisions on 
abortion"); see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
46 Clifford M. Greene et al., Note, Depoliticizing Legal Aid: A Constitutional Analysis of 
the Legal Services Corporation Act, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 734, 739 n.34 (1976). A report by 
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York drew a similar conclusion about the 1996 
restrictions: "Congressional proponents of the LSC restrictions made clear that their aim was 
to reduce or eliminate advocacy of disfavored positions." Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., 
supra note 21, at 52; see also BRENNAN ClR. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 34, at 14-15 (arguing 
that the motive behind denying federal funding to enforce certain statutory and constitutional 
rights was that certain special interest groups disapproved of those rights). 
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powerful interests in society. That does not mean there is something wrong with the 
[LSC] program; it means that it is doing its job.,,47 
In passing the LSC Act, Congress acknowledged that "providing legal 
assistance to those who face an economic barrier to adequate legal counsel will serve 
best the ends of justice.,,48 Yet for a poor person with access only to an LSC-funded 
attorney, certain unpopular legal rights cannot be defended or enforced. 
c. Restrictions on Methods ofLegal Representation 
The congressional purpose of the LSC Act declares that attorneys "must have 
full freedom to protect the best interests of their clients" in keeping with rules of 
professional responsibility and the high standards of the legal profession.49 In fact, as 
David Udell observed, a number of bar associations conditioned their support for the 
LSC Act on the insistence that lawyers for the poor have the same independence of 
professional judgment as is guaranteed to attorneys representing paying clients.5o 
Nevertheless, Congress now prohibits LSC grantees from participating in class 
action lawsuits, accepting attorneys' fee awards, soliciting new clients, and lobbying 
legislatures or government agencies. 
Class action lawsuits can be a significant and efficient means of addressing 
widespread violations of legal rights that otherwise might be ignored by the 
offending party or too difficult to litigate as individual cases. Commentators have 
documented numerous LSC class actions that brought important legal relief to large 
groups of poor persons.51 When Congress frrst adopted the LSC Act, it permitted 
47 Douglas S. Eakeley, Role of the Legal Services Corporation in Preserving Our 
National Commitment to Equal Access to Justice, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 741, 742 (quoting 
former Sen. Warren Rudman). As Rep. Christopher Shays argued: "What I cannot understand 
is why we blame [LSC-funded lawyers] for seeking to enforce laws we pass and the 
Constitution of the United States we would die defending." BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
supra note 34, at 20. 
48 LSC Act § 1000(1) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996(1) (2000». 
49 Id. § 1000(6). 
50 David S. Udell, Implication of the Legal Services Struggle for Other Government 
Grantsfor Lawyering for the Poor, 25 FORDHAMURB. LJ. 895, 901-02 (1998). 
51 Joshua D. Blank & Eric A. Zacks, Dismissing the Class: A Practical Approach to the 
Class Action Restriction on the Legal Services Corporation, 110 PENN. ST. L. REv. 1, 11-14 
(2005); Alan W. Houseman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor-A Commentary, 
83 GEO. L.J. 1669, 1686 (1995). Maryland Attorney General J. Joseph Curran explained in a 
1995 letter to Congress why class actions are an important tool for the poor: 
Sometimes Legal Services attorneys enforce the law by filing class-actions against 
the state . . . . Although I am happy to say that I believe the state of Maryland has 
had the better legal position in most of the cases, sometimes we don't. Government 
is not infallible. As uncomfortable and irritating as it may be, sometimes it is class­
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class action suits, provided the local project director approved the case in accordance 
with policies adopted by the grantee's governing board.52 Upset with the success of 
some class actions and pressured by special interest groups to rein in LSC attorneys, 
Congress acted in 1996 to bar LSC grantees from initiating or participating in any 
class action lawsuit, even with non-LSC funds.53 
There are many objections to denying an attorney the ability to address legal 
problems through a class action. In many situations, unlawful actions will go 
unchallenged, especially where claims may be too small or cumbersome to pursue 
individually, because a class action may be the only way to address such problems.54 
In addition, while class actions can force the defendant to change an entire program 
rather than simply the treatment of one complainant, the defendant can easily resolve 
or moot an individual lawsuit simply by settling with one plaintiff.55 Consequently, 
class actions can have a much greater deterrent effect on unlawful conduct than 
individual suits. In some cases, the mere threat of being able to bring a class action 
lawsuit can deter the wrongdoer. 
Moreover, contrary to Congress's stated intent to ensure lawyers have full 
freedom to protect the interests of their clients, the restriction on class actions denies 
LSC attorneys the freedom to use a legal tool that may be in the best interests of their 
clients and available to other attorneys not encumbered by the restriction. As a 
practical matter, while restricted attorneys can attack the client-by-elient symptoms 
of the problems that poor persons face, congressional restrictions largely deny them 
the ability to attack the legal causes of such problems.56 
The unavailability of class actions is especially problematic for the poor as their 
legal problems are often institutional in nature and in need of systemic changes.57 
actions by Legal Services lawyers that require the state to do what it is legally 
bound to do. 
BRENNAN Cm. FOR JUSTICE, MAKING THE CASE: LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR 13-14 
(1999) (quoting from the letter). 
52 LSC Act § l006(d)(5) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(d)(5) (2000». In 
addition, grantees could use non-LSC funds for class actions. Houseman, supra note 25, at 
2200. 
53 LSC Appropriations Act § 504(a)(7); 45 C.F.R. § 1617.5 (2005). 
54 See Blank & Zacks, supra note 51, at 11. 
55 Marie A. Failinger & Larry May, Litigating Against Poverty: Legal Services and 
Group Representation, 45 OHIO ST. LJ. 1, 17-18 (1984); Rhode, supra note 9, at 389. 
56 The inability to potentially bring a class action lawsuit to address illegal conduct has 
pushed legal services offices away from "wholesale justice" strategies to "retail justice" 
services with more limited relief to plaintiffs and fewer poor people assisted. Udell, supra note 
29, at 362--63. 
57 Failinger & May, supra note 55, at 18. As the Supreme Court observed, for politically 
and economically weak groups, "association for litigation may be the most effective form of 
political association." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963); see also NAACP v. 
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For the poor, most class actions seek government agency or private party compliance 
with the law, rather than monetary damages.58 The ban means that many unlawful 
actions will now go unchallenged and LSC-funded attorneys will be unable to bring 
greater legal relief to large groups of affected persons. lllegal acts against large 
classes of poor persons may be immunized from some claims, especially where the 
monetary harm to each individual person is relatively small. 
Congress also acted in 1996 to prohibit LSC attorneys from accepting 
attorneys' fees.59 The attorneys' fee restriction, enacted in response to complaints 
from the Farm Bureau over awards to legal aid lawyers from fanners who violated 
the law, applies even where the fees are statutorily permitted or required and even if 
the LSC grantee did not request fees but a court wished to grant them anyway.60 The 
inability to obtain attorneys' fees from the losing party means that poor persons have 
lost a form of legal relief that can significantly deter illegal conduct, since a 
prospective defendant might be less likely to engage in illegal conduct knowing it 
would be subject to the additional penalty of having to pay the poor person's 
attorneys' fees. Indeed, one reason courts award fees in civil rights cases is to help 
ensure compliance with the laws, both by increasing the costs of noncompliance 
with the law and by supporting lawsuits where the costs of bringing suit might 
otherwise be prohibitive. 
The ban on attorneys' fees may also harm a poor person's ability to induce a 
settlement. When a party is faced with the possibility of paying both its own and its 
opponent's attorneys' fees, any advantage from dragging out the lawsuit can become 
prohibitively costly.61 In addition, the ban denies any opportunity to structure a 
settlement that might involve waiving some statutory fees. Thus, an attorney for a 
poor person is without the same leverage in settlement negotiations that other parties 
enjoy. Finally, the ban on attorneys' fees denies legal services offices an important 
potential source of funding, effectively losing millions of dollars in fee awards that 
could be used to serve other needy clients.62 Once again, a legal tool available to 
wealthier clients is denied to attorneys representing the poor. 
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("Effective advocacy of both public and private points of 
view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association."). 
58 Blank & Zacks, supra note 51, at 15. 
59 LSC Appropriations Act § 504(a); 45 C.F.R. § 1642.3 (2005). 
60 LSC Appropriations Act § 504(a); 45 C.F.R. § 1642.3 (2005); BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE, supra note 34, at 6. 
61 See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 443 n.2 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (observing that the availability of statutory attorneys' fees to 
prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases "gives defendants strong incentives to avoid arguable 
civil rights violations in the fITst place and to make concessions in hope of an early 
settlement"); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Informal Ope 1403 (1977) 
(observing that the availability of statutory attorneys' fees is a negotiation tool for legal aid 
clients); see also Udell, supra note 50, at 903. 
62 See, e.g., Udell, supra note 29, at 359 (discussing how Florida Rural Voting Rights 
Project received over $2 million in attorneys' fees during the first half of the 1990s and how it 
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Congress also prohibits lawyers for the poor from representing a client whom 
the lawyer advised to obtain counselor take legal action, even if the attorney simply 
communicated the advice by a personal letter or telephone cal1.63 Agricultural 
employers pushed Congress to adopt this restriction as a way to limit the ability of 
LSC grantees to reach out to migrant farm workers in need of legal assistance.64 The 
LSC has interpreted this restriction to prohibit a grantee from handing out ail 
informational brochure about the availability of its free legal services to 
unrepresented tenants waiting in the courthouse for their eviction hearings.65 
The restriction on solicitation is especially harmful to poor people. The ABA 
and numerous state legal needs studies have found that two primary reasons poor 
persons do not seek legal assistance are because they are unaware of their legal 
rights and potential solutions, and they do not know about the availability of free 
legal assistance.66 Congress's motivation for the ban may be the concern that in the 
absence of a prohibition on solicitation, a legal services lawyer might encourage a 
poor person to assert a legal right. However, the Supreme Court declared that 
although providing a person with information about legal rights "might increase the 
use of the judicial machinery, we cannot accept the notion that it is always better for 
a person to suffer a wrong silently than to redress it by legal action.,,67 
The Supreme Court held that under the First Amendment, a state may not 
prohibit an attorney seeking to advance political or ideological goals or to advance 
association values from advising a person of their legal rights and offering free legal 
assistance.68 Similarly, rules of professional responsibility do not prohibit in-person 
or live telephone solicitation where the attorneys' motivation is not pecuniary, nor 
lost this source of funding after the 1996 restrictions were imposed); ALASKA ACCESS TO 
CIVIL JUSTICE TASK FORCE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 18 (1999), available at 
http://www.state.ak.us/courts/civjust.pdf [hereinafter ALASKA REPORT] (noting that Alaska 
allows the prevailing party in a lawsuit to collect attorneys' fees and costs and that Alaska 
Legal Services relied heavily on this as a source of funding before the 1996 restrictions were 
imposed). 
63 See LSC Appropriations Act § 504(a)(18); 45 C.F.R. § 1638.3 (2005). 
64 Norton, supra note 40, at 611 n.31. 
65 Office of Legal Affairs, Legal Servs. Corp., Interpretation of45 CFR 1638, External 
Ope EX-2003-1011, at 3 (2003), http://www.lsc.gov/laws/pdfs/olaeo/Ex-2003-1011.pdf. The 
LSC regulations do allow public service announcements, legal presentations to groups that 
request them, and informational brochures placed in clerk of court offices. 45 C.F.R. § 
1638.4(a) (2005). 
66 See LSC REPORT, supra note 2, at 13-14 (explaining the results of seven state legal 
needs studies); CONSORTIUM ONLEGALSERVS. & THE PUB., supra note 8, at 20-21. 
67 Bates V. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 376 (1977); see also Amy Busa & Carl G. Sussman, 
Expanding the Market for Justice: Arguments for Extending In-Person Client Solicitation, 34 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 487, 512-15 (1999) (arguing that the LSC restriction on the use of 
private funds for solicitation is unconstitutional). 
68 In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 414, 439 (1978); NAACP V. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428­
29 (1963). 
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do they prohibit other less direct forms of solicitation even where the motive is 
pecuniary.69 Indeed, those ethics rules recognize that "[t]he giving of advice that one 
should take legal action could well be in fulfillment of the duty of the legal 
profession to assist laypersons in recognizing legal problems.,,70 It is only federally 
funded lawyers for the poor, whose clients are most in need of information on their 
legal rights and available sources of free legal assistance,71 who stand gagged by the 
LSC restriction on solicitation. 
The final restriction on the means an LSC attorney may employ in representing 
an indigent person addresses lobbying. When Congress first passed the LSC Act, it 
prohibited legal services attorneys from attempting to influence legislation or any 
executive order, but, respecting the professional independence of the attorney, 
pennitted such activity when the attorney deemed it necessary for proper 
representation of an eligible client.72 However, Congress subsequently banned 
lobbying activities and today no LSC funds may be used to attempt to influence any 
executive order or regulation, or the passage or defeat of any legislation.73 
For many clients, legislation or a regulation may be the only or most 
appropriate relief, as well as the most efficient way, to address the client's needs.74 
The ABA's 2002 Standards for Providers of Civil Legal Services to the Poor stress 
that effective resolution of a client's problem may call for an attorney to challenge 
the offending law, policy, or practice through representation in administrative 
rulemaking proceedings or before a legislative body.75 Indeed, having a voice in 
legislative proceedings may be a more important means of legal representation for 
poor clients than for the more affluent, since the poor tend not to vote as often and 
are unable to influence elections and the legislative process through other means like 
campaign contributions.76 Yet, once again, Congress has denied LSC attorneys from 
69 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2003), available at http://www.abanet. 
org/cpr/mrpc/rule_7_3.html [hereinafter MODEL RUlES]. 
70 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBll.ITY EC 2-3 (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. 
71 The Supreme Court observed that "litigation may be the sole practicable avenue open 
to a minority to petition for redress of grievances." Button, 371 U.S. at 430. 
72 LSC Act § 1007(a)(5) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(5) (2000». The 
1996 restrictions also prohibited LSC recipients from raising constitutional challenges to 
welfare laws, but the Supreme Court held that this restriction violated the First Amendment 
and it no longer applies to grantees. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
73 LSC Appropriations Act § 504(a)(2); 45 C.F.R. §§ 1612.1 to .11 (2005). Recipients 
may use non-LSC funds to respond to a written request from a government agency or official 
for testimony, or information on existing or proposed legislation or regulations. 45 C.F.R. § 
1612.6 (2005). 
74 Paula Galowitz, Restrictions on Lobbying by Legal Services Attorneys: Redefining 
Professional Norms and Obligations, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 39, 71-72, 77 (1994). 
75 ABA STANDARDS FOR PROVIDERS OF C~ LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR 4, 92-95 
standards 5.5-5.6 & cmts. (2002) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS FOR PROVIDERS]. 
76 "Most interest groups in the United States are organized as lobbies with paid staff. 
Poor people, however, do not have [political action committee]s or access to other political 
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providing the same means of legal representation available to clients of private 
attorneys. 
Perhaps most harmful to poor persons is that in 1996 Congress did not just 
expand the restrictions on representing politically unpopular clients and causes by 
denying LSC attorneys the legal methods often most effective in addressing tlle 
problems faced by the poor, but it also banned LSC funds recipients from using 
other funds for any purpose prohibited by Congress. Hence, no LSC-funded entity 
can engage in any of the congressionally restricted activities, even if the activity is 
funded by non-LSC monies from the state, private foundations, or the bar.77 In tum, 
if an LSC-funded recipient transfers any funds to another person or entity, all of the 
congressional restrictions "will apply both to the LSC funds transferred and to the 
non-LSC funds of the person or entity to which those funds are transferred.,,78 
As a result of these additional funding rules, congressional restrictions 
encumber up to eighty-five percent of funding for civil legal services nationwide.79 
In twenty-one states, there is no legal service provider unencumbered by the 
restrictions; in fourteen others, there is only one unrestricted civil legal assistance 
entity.80 
When the restrictions are considered as a whole, Congress's claimed effort 
toward de-politicalization has actually been an attempt to protect the status quo and 
reward special interests.81 The result is that it is now much harder for the poor to get 
an attorney, especially if they are a member of an unpopular group or if they are 
asserting an unpopular claim, and it is harder for that attorney to be effective. 
resources, and their communications with government are conventionally mediated through an 
attorney." Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., supra note 21, at 37. 
77 LSC Appropriations Act § 504(d)(1); 45 C.F.R. § 1610.3 (2005). 
78 45 C.F.R. § 1610.7(a) (2005). However, if the funds are transferred to a bar 
association, pro bono program, or private attorney solely for the purpose of funding private 
attorney involvement in the delivery of legal assistance to eligible low-income clients, then the 
restrictions shall apply only to the funds transferred. Id. § 1610.7(c); see also ide §§ 1614.1 
to .7; infra notes 130-132 and accompanying text. 
79 Abel & Udell, supra note 27, at 881. For a list of studies noting the effects of the 
federal restrictions, see ide at 875 n.3, 880 n.26. State and local governments have become 
increasingly important sources of funding for legal assistance. ABA, INNOVATIVE 
FuNDRAISING IDEAS FOR LEGAL SERVICES 115 (2004). In 2005, legal assistance funding from 
state legislatures through appropriations and court fees and fines totaled over $163 million. 
PERLS CHART, supra note 23; E-mail from Meredith McBurney, supra note 23. As of 2002, 
legislative funding in eighteen states was encumbered by restrictions. BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE, CHART OF RESTRICTIONS ON STAlE AND IOLTA FuNDING FOR CWIL LEGAL AID 
(2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter BRENNAN CTR. CHART]. 
80 Brief of the New York State Bar Ass'n et ale as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents 
at 23 n.8, Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (Nos. 99-603 & 99-960) 
(citing statistics compiled by the ABA and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association 
as of 2000); see also Rhode, supra note 9, at 388-89 ("In many jurisdictions, no non-federally 
funded organizations are available to pursue restricted activities."). 
81 See Greene et al., supra note 46, at 775. 
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Although all members of the legal profession should strenuously object to such 
restrictions, the next section demonstrates that lawyers actually have reinforced this 
unequal treatment of the poor. 
ill. THE LEGAL PROFESSION'S RESTRICTIONS ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
Members of the legal profession in every state have responded to the 
widespread unmet legal needs of low-income persons by developing fundraising and 
volunteer lawyer programs to help provide free legal assistance. These programs 
generally are run by the state supreme court or bar association, which usually define 
who is eligible to receive the funds or other assistance and impose any restrictions on 
their use. Although intended to help lower-income persons gain equal access to the 
legal system, many of the programs developed or controlled by members of the bar 
contain the same onerous restrictions on legal representation imposed by Congress 
on recipients of LSC funds. In some bar legal assistance programs and in rules 
relating to representation by law school clinics, members of the legal profession have 
knowingly chosen to deny legal assistance or certain legal services to needy lower­
income persons. In other situations, it appears that attorneys and judges have failed 
to appreciate that their efforts to expand civil legal assistance actually have 
reinforced Congress's denial of assistance. The net results of these actions by 
attorneys are to further deny legal assistance to disfavored clients or causes and to 
limit the effectiveness of legal representation for the poor. 
A. Interest on Lawyer Trust Account Restrictions 
Interest on Lawyer Trust Account ("IOLTA") programs exist in all states as a 
means of generating funds for civil legal services for the poor.82 Although five 
IOLTA programs were created by state legislatures, the rest are established under the 
authority and rules of the state supreme courts and run by committees of attorneys.83 
Under IOLTA, client funds that otherwise would not earn interest are pooled into 
interest-bearing accounts; after bank fees are paid, the remaining funds are dedicated 
to access-to-justice programs.84 In 2005, IOLTA programs raised over $107 million 
for legal assistance programs.85 
82 Brennan J. Torregrossa, Note, Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal Access 
to Justice Foundation: Is There an Iota ofProperty Interest in IOLTA?, 42 VILL. L. REv. 189, 
191 (1997); ABA, Commission on Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, What Is IOLTA?, 
http://www.abanet.orgllegalservices/iolta/ioltback.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2006) 
[hereinafter What Is IOLTA?]. 
83 ABA, Commission on Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, Status of IOLTA 
Programs, http://www.abanet.orgllegalservices/iolta/ioltus.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2006). 
84 What Is IOLTA?, supra note 82. In Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of IOLTA programs against claims that they 
violated clients' First and Fifth Amendment rights. 538 u.S. 216, 240-41 (2003). Even on the 
issue of lobbying, the Supreme Court of Washington recently denied a proposal to prohibit the 
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As of 2002, the rules governing at least fifteen IOLTA programs restrict access 
to legal representation on grounds other than income or limit the legal services that 
attorneys may provide to needy clients.86 All fifteen prohibit the use of IOLTA funds 
for lobbying, with at least three prohibiting any attempt to influence executive 
branch rulemaking or orders.87 These prohibitions apply even where the attorney 
believes that lobbying is the most effective means of representation for that client.88 
Three state IOLTA programs mirror the federal congressional restriction on 
participating in class action lawsuits.89 Again, even if it is determined by the attorney 
or another appropriate person that a class action is needed to bring relief to a large 
group of otherwise unrepresented poor persons, no exception is made. 
In addition to these restrictions, the IOLTA program in Texas prohibits the use 
of funds for any lawsuit against a governmental entity unless the suit is on behalf of 
an individual seeking to compel entitlement to government benefits.90 
Pennsylvania's IOLTA program includes a restriction prohibiting representation of a 
person seeking an abortion and limits eligible clients to the elderly, disabled, 
homeless, farm workers, or victims of crime or abuse.91 New York's IOLTA rules do 
not contain restrictions but critics charge that the oversight board has exercised its 
use of IOLTA funds for lobbying, rejecting the argument that such use violates the First 
Amendment rights of clients. In re Adoption of the New Set of Rilles of Profl Conduct and 
Necessary Companion Amendments Thereto, No. 257oo-A-851 (Wash. July 10, 2006) 
(including dissent to order on rules); see also Curt Woodward, Legal Services Firm, Farm 
Bureau Face Off over Lobbying, ASSOCIAlED PREss, Aug. 5, 2006, available at 8/5/06 
APALERTPOLITICS 20:44:51 (Westlaw). 
85 PERLS CHART, supra note 23; E-mail from Meredith McBurney, supra note 23. 
86 BRENNAN CTR. CHART, supra note 79. State IOLTA boards sometimes impose 
restrictions on the use of funds by individual grantees even where the rules do not contain such 
limits. See, e.g., Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts Program of the State of Delaware, Grant 
Package (2007) (on file with author); E-mail fromSusanW.Corbin.DeI.BarFound.• to 
author (July 14, 2(06) (on file with author). 
87 BRENNAN CTR. CHART, supra note 79 (identifying lobbying restrictions in Alabama, 
Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, North 
Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia). In contrast, the Washington 
Supreme Court, at the urging of the Washington State Bar Association and Legal Foundation 
of Washington (the entity administering the state's IOLTA program), recently rejected a 
petition from the Washington State Farm Bureau to prohibit the use of IOLTA funds for 
lobbying. Woodward, supra note 84; Letter from M. Janice Michels, Wash. State Bar Ass'n, 
to Charles W. Johnson, Justice, Wash. Supreme Court (Jan. 23, 2(06) (on file with author); 
Letter from Michael E. Schwab & Caitlin Davis Carlson, Legal Found. of Wash., to Charles 
W. Johnson, Justice, Wash. Supreme Court (May 3,2(06) (on file with author). 
88 Under South Carolina's IOLTA rules, lobbying any governmental body is prohibited 
unless a waiver is obtained from IOLTA's Board of Directors. BRENNAN CTR. CHART, supra 
note 79. 
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grant discretion to discourage or prevent challenges to government agencies and 
representation of undocumented aliens.92 
Even if explicit IOLTA restrictions do not apply to the use of the funds, where 
IOLTA access-to-justice funds are provided to an LSC grantee, the state IOLTA 
funds become subject to the same broad array of restrictions imposed by Congress.93 
In some states, such as Arkansas, Missouri, and West Virginia, nearly all IOLTA 
funds have been allocated to LSC grant recipients and are now effectively 
encumbered with Congress's expansive restrictions.94 
Because of restrictions in some bar IOLTA programs, many poor clients that 
have been cut off by Congress from federally funded legal representation also have 
been denied representation through the very bar-sponsored programs whose stated 
purpose is to expand the availability of much needed legal assistance to the state's 
poor residents. 
B. Restrictions on the Use ofBar Membership Dues 
A growing number of state supreme courts or bar associations have increased 
annual fees or dues to help fund free legal assistance for indigent residents or added 
a line item on annual dues statements directing funds to legal assistance programs.95 
In some states these additional legal aid dues are mandatory, while in others 
members are allowed to opt out of the additional dues or simply allowed to pay an 
additional voluntary assessment to assist with access-to-justice programs.96 As with 
IOLTA programs, some state fees or dues programs restrict the poor clients or 
causes that may benefit from the contribution, either by dedicating the funds to the 
state's restricted IOLTA program or by directing all funds to LSC grantees who 
cannot use the dues for any purpose prohibited by Congress.97 
92 See Victoria Rivkin, lOLA Funding Changes Prompt Attacks by Critics, N.Y. LJ., 
Mar. 20, 2000, at 1, 6; Randal C. Archibold, Funds Stopped for Legal Programs Helping 
Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,2001, at B6. 
93 45 C.F.R. § 1610.3 (2005); LSC Appropriations Act § 504(d); BRENNAN ClR. FOR 
JUSTICE, SlRUGGLING TO MEET THE NEED: COMMUNITIES CONFRONT GAPS IN FEDERAL 
LEGALAID 18 (2003), available at http://www. brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/atj8.pdf. 
94 BRENNANClR. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 93, at 18-19. 
95 National Legal Aid & Defender Association, Access to Justice Support Project, Bar 
Dues Increase to Help Fund Legal Aid in West Virginia (2005); http://www.n1ada.org/CiviV 
Civil_SPAN/SPAN_Library/document_list?state=WV (follow "West Virginia State Bar dues 
increase to help fund legal aid" hyperlink); PERLS CHART, supra note 23. A number of 
voluntary local bar associations also include bar due assessments for legal assistance. PERLS 
CHART, supra note 23. 
96 Pai, supra note 26, at 95 (discussing the mandatory fee increases); ABA, supra note 
79, at 10-16 (describing efforts of state bars to increase attorney registration fees or dues to 
fund legal services for the poor). 
97 See, e.g., Supreme Court of Pa., Pennsylvania Interest on Lawyers Trust Account 
Board (on file with author) (directing bar dues to restricted IOLTA program); TEx. EQUAL 
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Some have questioned the appropriateness of using bar dues to support legal aid 
programs. However, the Supreme Court held in Keller v. State Bar ofCalifornia that 
where dues are required as a condition of practicing law, the mandatory assessment 
would not violate the bar member's First Amendment rights if the bar spends 
members' dues on activities "necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of 
regulating the legal profession or 'improving the quality of the legal service available 
to the people of the State.,,,98 As the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated, because 
mandatory assessment funds "are specifically designated to provide direct legal 
services to the poor, so as to maintain access to the justice system and improve the 
quality of the legal services available for all the citizens of this state," they are 
consistent with activities recognized as permissible under the state and federal 
constitutions.99 Thus, there should be no constitutional objection to using bar dues to 
help provide access to legal representation to those without the financial means to 
hire an attorney. 
C. Restrictions on Law School Clinics 
Law school clinics provide a significant amount of free legal assistance to the 
poor and other unrepresented individuals and groups. Professor David Luban 
estimated that with 1400 law clinic instructors and thousands of law students, clinics 
at 182 law schools provide as many as three million hours of free legal work each 
year for needy clients..100 On a number of occasions, attorneys have sought to prevent 
law school clinics from providing assistance to controversial clients that otherwise 
would go unrepresented. 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOUND., RESlRICTIONS ON LEGAL SERVICES FuNDs IN TEXAS (2004), 
http://www.teajf.orgigrants/docslFundin~Restrictions.pdf (detailing restrictions on Texas 
Basic Civil Legal Services Program funds); E-mail from Keith A. Birkes, Executive Dir., Mo. 
Bar, to author (June 12, 2006) (on file with author) (stating that bar dues are distributed to 
restricted LSC grantees); E-mail from Emily Jones, Access to Justice Div. Dir., State Bar of 
Tex., to author (June 13, 2006) (on file with author) (stating that sixty-five dollars of the Texas 
bar membership fee is deposited into the Basic Civil Legal Services Program Account). 
98 Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990) (quoting Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 
843 (1961». The court further explained: 
The State Bar may therefore constitutionally fund activities germane to those goals 
[of regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services] out 
of the mandatory dues of all members. It may not, however, in such manner fund 
activities of an ideological nature which fall outside of those areas of activity. 
Id. 
99 In re Petition of the Wis. Trust Account Found., Inc., 2005 WI 35, 277 Wis. 2d xiii, 
xvi (2005); see also Pai, supra note 26, at 95-97. 
100 Luban, supra note 12, at 236 & n.108. Luban estimates that law schools invest around 
$280 million annually in law clinics. Id. at 236 & n.107. 
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In 1998, the Louisiana Supreme Court was urged by the governor, business 
interests, and some prominent attorneys to curb the activities of the Tulane 
University School of Law's Environmental Law Clinic. lOl The attorneys attacking 
the clinic never showed how the clinic clients would find alternative representation. 
They simply argued that it was not fair for businesses to have to defend lawsuits 
brought by the clinic. l02 The state bar stood silent, refusing to take a position on the 
appropriateness of restricting the ability of the state's law clinics to provide free 
representation.103 
Nevertheless, the justices of the court adopted new restrictions both on the 
kinds of needy clients eligible for representation by the state's law clinics and on 
how clinics can represent those clients. Among other new restrictions, the justices 
mandated that law clinics in Louisiana may only represent clients who meet the 
LSC's indigent guidelines (rather than simply showing that they cannot afford the 
services of a private attorney), cannot represent any organization unless the clinic 
certifies that at least fifty-one percent of the organization's members meet the LSC's 
poverty guidelines, cannot represent any person if the clinic initiated contact for the 
purpose of providing representation, and cannot appear in any representative 
capacity before the legislature.104 The chief justice of the court sought to justify the 
restrictions by arguing that poor persons were not entitled to the same legal 
representation as those who can afford private attorneys: "widespread advocacy 
campaigns by professors and students are beyond the legal parameters of helping 
indigent people.,,105 One commentator characterized the justices' actions as "the 
equivalent of selectively disbarring attorneys who have won on controversial 
matters.,,106 
The attorney who represented the Louisiana Supreme Court when law clinics 
and clinic clients challenged the new restrictions later sought to get the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to restrict the ability of law clinics to appear 
before that court, but was unsuccessful. l07 Attorneys also have sought to restrict the 
free legal services offered by law clinics at the University of Tennessee, University 
of Oregon, and University of Pittsburgh law schools. l08 At the University of 
101 See Robert R. Kuehn, Denying Access to Legal Representation: The Attack on the 
Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 33,65-75 (2000) (noting the 
efforts of the governor's special counsel and New Orleans attorneys). The author was the 
director of the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic at the time of these events. 
102 Id. at 66-69,121. 
103 Id. at 70. 
104 LA. SUP. CT. R. XX (Limited Participation of Law Students in Trial Work). 
105 James Varney, Justice Calogero Seeking 3rd Term: Rough Campaign Is Anticipated, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 7, 1998, at A2. 
106 Frank H. Wu, A Lesson in Power Politics, NAT'LLJ., May 3,1999, at A21. 
107 Robert R. Kuehn & Peter A. Joy, An Ethics Critique of Interference in Law School 
Clinics, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 1971, 1985 (2003). 
108 Robert R. Kuehn, Shooting the Messenger: The Ethics ofAttacks on Environmental 
Representation, 26 HARv. ENVlL. L. REv. 417, 425-26, 429-30 (2002). 
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Pittsburgh, a state supreme court justice stepped into a controversy over the school's 
environmental law clinic by characterizing the clinic's efforts to enforce planning 
requirements in a federal environmental law as the inappropriate "teaching of 
rudimentary social activism rather than law" and proposing that the clinic be shut 
down. l09 In none of these instances did the state bar association defend the actions of 
the law clinics or argue against imposing restrictions on the availability of legal 
assistance to needy clients. 110 
Even law school faculties have at times sought to limit the ability of law clinics 
to provide free legal assistance to controversial cases or clients. At the University of 
Oregon School of Law, some members of the faculty proposed shutting down the 
school's environmental law clinic as a way to appease critics of the clinic.111At the 
University of Tennessee, a young law professor active in controversial pro bono 
environmental cases was denied tenure after being told that he "did not sufficiently 
understand the moderation expected of Tennessee law professors."112 
As a result of these and other attacks by attorneys on law school clinics, "some 
law professors and law clinics have refused to represent certain cases or clients out 
of fears that taking such cases could result in problems with their job security or 
threats to their school's funding."113 In none of the instances where attorneys sought 
to restrict the ability of needy clients to gain access to law clinic representation did 
those attorneys provide an alternative source of representation. As one law professor 
explained, attorneys attacking law clinics are upset because the clinics are "bringing 
suits that wouldn't be brought at all if the clinic didn't do it."u4 
D. Restrictions in Other Access to Legal Representation Initiatives 
State supreme courts and bar associations have developed a number of 
volunteer lawyer programs and innovative initiatives to raise funds for legal services 
such as lawyer-sponsored foundations, cy pres awards, and pro hac vice fees. A 
significant number of these pro bono and funding programs restrict the legal 
assistance provided to poor persons. 
109 Letter from Ralph J. Cappy, Justice, Supreme Court of Pa., to William V. Luneburg, 
Professor, Univ. of Pittsburgh Sch. of Law (Oct. 2, 2(01) (on file with author). 
110 See Kuehn, supra note 108, at 425-32. 
111 Alan Pittman, UO Environmental Law Clinic Funding Axed, WHAT'S HAPPENING? 
(Eugene, Or.), Sept. 2, 1993, at 1. 
112 E-mail from Zygmunt Plater, Professor, Boston ColI. of Law, to author (Sept. 17, 
2(01) (on file with author); E-mail from Zygmunt Plater, Professor, Boston ColI. of Law, to 
author (Sept. 13, 2(01) (on file with author). 
113 Kuehn, supra note 108, at 431; see also Luban, supra note 12, at 240 (arguing that 
even if the previous attacks on clinics failed, "they were near misses, and eventually some will 
succeed. Indeed, they may already have succeeded in one of their aims, because clinic 
directors will undoubtedly hesitate before taking on volatile cases that may provoke dangerous 
backlash against the clinics or their law schools"). 
114 A.F. Conard, "Letter from the Law Clinic," 26 J. LEGAL Enuc. 194,204 (1974). 
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Lawyer-sponsored contributions can involve either one-time or annual 
solicitations of donations from lawyers or law firms toward free legal assistance for 
the poor. These programs are present in most states and provide significant financial 
assistance to LSC offices and other providers of free legal assistance. IIS In 2005, the 
legal profession contributed over $57 million to legal assistance programs through 
attorney fee registration funds, bar dues assessments, pro hac vice fees, or other 
lawyer or bar association donations. 116 
Although information is not available on the extent of any restrictions on the 
use of these funds, grant guidelines or discretionary decisions on individual grant 
awards for these programs may impose some of the same restrictions on the use of 
the funds as those imposed by Congress on LSC funds, either by explicitly excluding 
some clients or means of representation, or by indirectly incorporating restrictions in 
the state IOLTA or other program to which the funds are dedicated. Moreover, 
where the funds are provided to recipients of LSC grants, those private bar funds 
may not be used for any purpose or activity prohibited by Congress.117 
Unclaimed class action awards or criminal restitution funds are often 
distributed using the doctrine of cy pres by directing the residuals to another use that 
still furthers the objectives of the underlying award or fund. 118 In a nurrlber of cases, 
these cy pres awards have gone to legal organizations and law school clinics to help 
advance their legal assistance programs, including awards of up to $2 million.119 
Courts controlling cy pres funds look to the attorneys in the case for direction 
on how best to distribute the residual funds and for nominations of appropriate 
recipients. As with other discretionary decisions to distribute funds for legal 
assistance to the poor, judges and attorneys in these cases may, either consciously or 
115 ABA & NATIONAL LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
PAR1NERSHIPS STATE BY STATE 29-31 (2005) [hereinafter ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
PAR1NERSHIPS] (providing examples of successful lawyer fundraising programs in Arizona, 
Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin); ABA, supra note 79, at 3-9,29­
33 (providing similar examples in Atlanta, Boston, Columbus, Nashville, Oregon, Texas, 
Utah, and West Virginia). The National Legal Aid and Defender Association estimates that 
bar campaigns for civil legal assistance exist in nearly one hundred communities. National 
Legal Aid & Defender Association, Civil Resources, IOLTA & Other Funding, 
http://www.nlada.org/CiviVCivil_ IOLTAlIOLTA_Bar (last visited Nov. 14,2(06). 
116 PERLS CHART, supra note 23; E-mail from Meredith McBurney, supra note 23. 
117 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text; see also ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
PARlNERSHIPS, supra note 115, at 30 (explaining that lawyer foundation funds in Colorado 
and Delaware were distributed to LSC grantees). 
118 Pai, supra note 26, at 93. 
119 Id. at 94-95 (identifying cy pres awards for legal assistance in California, Illinois, and 
New York); see also ACCESS TO JUSTICE PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 115, at 29 (providing 
similar examples from Minnesota, Montana, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington); 
ABA, supra note 79, at 45-49 (providing similar examples from Illinois, Oregon, and 
Washington). 
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inadvertently, restrict the use of these funds either by directing the funds to another 
program (such as IOLTA) with existing restrictions or to a restricted LSC grant 
recipient. 
Pro hac vice fees paid by out-of-state lawyers to appear in state courts are 
another newer source of funding for civil legal assistance.12o Where the proceeds of 
those fees are controlled by the state supreme COurt/21 the court must consider, as 
with the other innovative funding programs above, if it is appropriate to restrict the 
use of those funds or if providing the funds to some legal assistance providers may 
encumber those pro hac vice proceeds with the congressional LSC restrictions.122 
A final area where the legal profession may be reinforcing congressional 
restrictions on access to legal representation is through volunteer lawyer or other pro 
bono programs ("VLPs"). The ABA estimates there are over 900 pro bono programs 
referring civil matters for lower-income persons to private attorneys.123 As many as 
150,000 private attorneys are registered to participate in LSC-funded pro bono 
programs.124 Those familiar with pro bono programs believe that proportionally few 
serve the residual poor clients that are prohibited by Congress from representation, 
in part because the programs often obtain referrals or funds from the local LSC 
office and, consequently, tend to follow the office's restrictions.125 
120 ACCESS TO JUSTICE PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 115, at 28 (identifying pro hac vice 
fees as funding sources for legal aid in Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Oregon, and 
Texas); ABA, supra note 79, at 25-27 (identifying Mississippi, Missouri, Oregon, and Texas 
as using pro hac vice fees to fund legal services). 
121 In some states, the legislature, rather than the state supreme court, may dictate how 
pro hac vice fees may be used. In Texas, for example, the legislature has directed that the fees 
be deposited into the restricted Basic Civil Legal Services account. See generally TEx. EQUAL 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOUND., supra note 97. 
122 See, e.g., E-mail from Keith A. Birkes, supra note 97 (explaining that all of 
Missouri's pro hac vice fees go to LSC recipients). 
123 SUPPORTING JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 6. 
124 ALAN W. HOUSEMAN, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POllCY, CWIL LEGAL AID IN THE 
UNITED STAlES: AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROGRAM IN 2003, at 3 (2003), available at http:// 
www.clasp.orglpublicationslLegal_Aid_2003.pdf. 
125 E-mail from Linda Lund, Volunteer Lawyers Program, Ala. State Bar, to author (June 
7,2006) (on file with author) (estimating that a majority of pro bono programs are run by the 
LSC-funded program in the state); E-mail fromCherylZalenski.ABACtr.forProBono.to 
author (July 24, 2006) (on file with author) (explaining that over thirty-five percent of the 932 
pro bono programs in the ABA's database appear to receive LSC funding in some form); E­
mail from Cheryl Zalenski, ABA Ctr. for Pro Bono, to author (July 14, 2006) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Zalenski July 14 E-mail] (opining that, based on anecdotal evidence, 
proportionally few pro bono programs handle LSC-restricted cases); see, e.g., Delaware 
Volunteer Legal Services, http://www.dvls.orgl (last visited Nov. 14, 2006) (not providing 
representation for any class action); Houston Volunteer Lawyers Program, Do You Qualify?, 
http://www.houstonlegalhelp.orgldoyouqualify.asp (last visited Dec. 31, 2006) (not providing 
representation to any incarcerated person); Mobile Bar Association Volunteer Lawyers 
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Attorneys nlnning these VLPs need to understand that ineligible LSC clients 
can be referred by an LSC office to pro bono attorneys without subjecting the 
program to congressional restrictions. For example, the LSC restriction on assistance 
for certain aliens states that none of the funds appropriated by Congress may be used 
to provide "legal assistance for or on behalf of any alien.,,126 The implementing 
regulations explicitly state that "legal assistance does not include normal intake and 
referral services.,,127 Therefore, where the LSC office does the intake for the VLP, 
some programs have likely been excluding aliens who are not otherwise prevented 
by Congress from receiving that voluntary assistance. 
Prisoners likewise can be referred by LSC grantees to VLPs. Congress prohibits 
funds to any person or entity "that participates in any litigation on behalf of a person 
incarcerated in a Federal, State or local prison."128 By simply referring a prisoner to a 
pro bono program, the LSC grant recipient does not participate in litigation. 
Therefore, LSC grantees can and should refer prisoners through their normal intake 
and referral services to pro bono programs. 
The same is true for persons who are ineligible for legal representation in a 
public housing eviction proceeding because of a drug charge. Congress has only 
prohibited funding an entity "that defends a person in a proceeding to evict the 
person from a public housing project.,,129 Because an intake referral of a person 
charged with a drug crime to a pro bono program would not constitute defending that 
person in an eviction proceeding, VLPs that rely on LSC grantees for intake and 
referral should receive referrals of and provide legal assistance to such persons. 
Although it appears that Congress's restrictions would disallow VLPs who 
receive LSC funds from aiding certain clients at all, in fact VLPs may match these 
LSC ineligible clients with private pro bono attorneys even if the program receives 
"private attorney involvement" ("PAr') funds from an LSC grantee. Generally, a 
recipient of LSC funding must devote at least twelve-and-one-half percent of the 
annual award to the involvement of private attorneys in the delivery of legal services 
to the poor. 130 Many state VLPs receive PAI funds to help finance their programs.131 
Although a transfer of LSC funds to another entity usually requires the entity 
receiving the transferred funds to comply with all of the congressional restrictions, 
an exception is made for transfers of PAI funds. LSC regulations specify that where 
funds are transferred to bar associations, pro bono programs, private attorneys, or 
law firms for the sole purpose of funding PAI activities, the congressional 
Program, http://www.vlpmobile.org/ (follow "download the Application and Eligibility 
Form" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 31, 2006) (not providing representation to aliens). 
126 LSC Appropriations Act § 504(a)(II); 45 C.F.R. § 1626.3 (2005). 
127 45 C.F.R. § 1626.3 (2005). 
128 LSC Appropriations Act § 504(a)(15); see also 45 C.F.R. § 1637.3 (2005). 
129 LSC Appropriations Act § 504(a)(17); see also 45 C.F.R. § 1633.3 (2005). 
130 45 C.F.R. § 1614.1(a) (2005). 
131 Zalenski July 14 E-mail, supra note 125 (identifying over thirty-five percent of the 
932 pro bono programs in the country as receiving LSC funding in some form). 
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restrictions apply only to the funds transferred and not to all of the programs or 
funds of the private attorney recipient. 132 Thus, a VLP may accept PAl funds without 
having to comply with the congressional restrictions imposed on LSC funds in 
general, provided the VLP also is funded from other non-LSC sources. 
Between the ability of LSC grantees to engage in intake and referral activities 
even for ineligible clients and the ability of VLPs to accept PAl funding without 
having to comply with the LSC restrictions, the lawyer programs should not allow 
the congressional restrictions to discourage them from providing free legal assistance 
to any needy person. As noted above, because in many places there are no non-LSC 
funded organizations to represent persons or causes restricted by Congress,133 it is 
particularly important that VLPs, and indeed all programs sponsored by or assisted 
by the bar, be available to provide such assistance. Otherwise, certain groups may be 
completely cut off from legal assistance and the ability to obtain equal justice under 
the law. 
In all legal assistance programs created or controlled by the legal profession, the 
judges and attorneys involved must keep in mind that the restrictions imposed by 
Congress on LSC grantees do not reflect objective decisions about the neediest poor 
clients, the most significant legal needs of the poor, or the most appropriate legal 
methods for attaining a client's goals. Instead, as outlined above in Part II, those 
restrictions on clients, causes, and methods of legal representation are political and 
ideological judgments reflecting hostility toward certain controversial clients and 
causes. Thus, in adopting restrictions that Congress has imposed on LSC grantees, 
members of the legal profession are not objectively directing the funds to those most 
in need or to where the funds will be most beneficial. Furthermore, as the next 
section argues, professional norms prohibit attorneys from condoning efforts to deny 
legal assistance to any unpopular clients or causes. 
N.	 THE NORMATIVE CASE AGAINST THE LEGAL PROFESSION'S INvOLVEMENT IN 
RESTRICTING ACCESS TO LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
The principles of the legal profession strongly promote unrestricted access to 
legal representation for all persons unable to afford the assistance of an attorney. The 
concept of equal access to the justice system has been repeatedly and forcefully 
stated by ethics rules, ethics opinions, the organized bar, and notions of 
professionalism. By making it clear that attorneys must uphold the ideal of equal 
access, it follows that the legal profession should play no part in conditioning the 
availability of legal assistance or the type of legal assistance rendered on any criteria 
other than objective resource allocation or legal needs. 
132 45 C.F.R. § 1610.7 (2005).
 
133 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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A. Ethical Precepts Advance Unrestricted Access to Legal Representation 
The legal profession's commitment to equal access to legal representation is 
reflected in the ethical precepts governing the profession. The ABA's Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"), the basis for ethics rules in forty-six states 
and the District of Columbia, states in the preamble that: 
A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice 
and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, 
cannot afford adequate legal assistance. Therefore, all lawyers should 
devote professional time and resources and use civic influence to ensure 
equal access to our system of justice for all those who because of 
economic or social barriers cannot afford or secure adequate legal 
counsel.134 
The ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code"), the 
primary source for ethics rules until the adoption of the Model Rules and still the 
basis for ethics rules in two states, similarly declares that "every person in our 
society should have ready access to the independent professional services of a 
lawyer of integrity and competence" and reminds lawyers that an important function 
of the profession is to "assist in making legal services fully available.,,135 
This commitment to access to legal representation is reflected in ethics rules 
creating the duty on all individual lawyers to help those unable to afford an attorney. 
The Model Rules both create a professional responsibility on every lawyer to 
provide legal services to those unable to pay and direct every lawyer to support 
government and bar programs that provide free legal services to persons of limited 
financial means.136 The Model Code states that "[a] lawyer should assist the legal 
profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel available," and enjoins every 
134 MODEL RUlES, supra note 69, at pmbl. 1 6, available at http://www.abanet. 
org/cpr/mrpc/preamble.html; see ABA, Center for Professional Responsibility, Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct: Dates of Adoption, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/rnrpc/alpha_states. 
html (last visited Nov. 14, 2006) (listing the states that have adopted the Model Rilles). 
135 MODEL CODE, supra note 70, at EC 1-1, 2-1. New York and Ohio presently follow 
the Model Code, while California and Maine have not adopted either the Model Code or the 
Model Rules. ABAlBNA, LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 01:3-4 (2006). 
Ohio is dropping its Model Code-based standards and will replace them with a version of the 
Model Rilles on February 1, 2007. ABAlBNA, In Switch to Model Rules, Ohio Adopts MJP 
but Keeps Unique Standards from Prior Code, in LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT 389 (2006). 
136 MODEL RULES, supra note 69, at R. 6.1 & cmts. 1, 10. The Model Rilles add that 
"[l]aw firms should act reasonably to enable and encourage all lawyers in the firm to provide 
the pro bono legal services called for by this Rille." Id. at R. 6.1 cmt. 11. 
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lawyer to support efforts to meet the need for legal services of those unable to pay 
for an attomey.137 
The Model Rules are particularly strong in condemning any denial of legal 
representation based on the identity of the client or cause: "Legal representation 
should not be denied to people who are unable to afford legal services, or whose 
cause is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval."138 The Model Code 
likewise states that representation should not be declined "because a client or cause 
is unpopular or community reaction is adverse" or "to avoid adversary alignment 
against judges, other lawyers, public officials, or influential members of the 
community."139 
Ethics rules clarify that representation of a client, as well as a lawyer's or the 
bar's role in making legal representation fully available to all needy persons, "does 
not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral 
views or activities.,,14o This position is reinforced by a comment in the Restatement 
of Law Governing Lawyers ("Restatement") that "it is a tradition that a lawyer's 
advocacy for a client should not be construed as an expression of the lawyer's 
personal views.,,141 
The Model Rules go even further and declare that individual lawyers have an 
obligation to represent the kinds of unpopular clients that are denied assistance by 
some legal aid programs: "All lawyers have a responsibility to assist in providing pro 
bono publico service . . . . An individual lawyer fulfills this responsibility by 
accepting a fair share of unpopular matters or indigent or unpopular clients.,,142 An 
ABA report on professional responsibility argued that one of the highest services the 
bar can render to society is to represent the very clients and causes that are 
disfavored by Congress or the public.143 Hence, in the view of ethics rules and the 
ABA, ensuring that a full range of legal services is available to all needy persons is 
137 MODEL CODE, supra note 70, at Canon 2, EC 2-25. 
138 MODEL RUlES, supra note 69, at R. 1.2 cmt. 5. 
139 MODEL CODE, supra note 70, at EC 2-27, 2-28. 
140 MODEL RULES, supra note 69, at R. 1.2(b) & cmt. 5 ("By the same token, 
representing a client does not constitute approval of the client's views or activities."); see also 
MODEL CODE, supra note 70, at EC 7-17 (noting that an attorney "may take positions on 
public issues and espouse legal reforms he favors without regard to the individual views of any 
client"). 
141 RESTA1EMENT (THlRD) OF LAW GoVERNING LAWYERS § 125 cmt. e (2000) 
[hereinafter RESTA1EMENT]. 
142 MODEL RULES, supra note 69, at R. 6.2 cmt. 1. The Model Code explains that 
furtherance of the bar's objective to make legal services fully available "requires acceptance 
by a lawyer of his share of tendered employment which may be unattractive both to him and 
the bar generally." MODEL CODE, supra note 70, at EC 2-26. 
143 Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1216 
(1958) (reprinting report of the ABA and Association of American Law Schools Joint 
Conference on Professional Responsibility). 
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neither a political statement by an attorney or the bar nor an endorsement of that 
person's positions. It is simply a commitment to equal access to legal representation. 
In addition to condemning any effort to deny legal services to unpopular clients 
or causes, ethics rules aim to ensure that all lawyers exercise independent 
professional judgment in determining the best means to meet each client's 
objectives144 and "take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to 
vindicate a client's cause or endeavor.,,145 The Restatement warns that lawyers who 
are paid to represent indigent clients must ensure they will exercise the same 
independent professional judgment that other attorneys must traditionally follow in 
determining how best to represent a client.146 By nowhere suggesting that the legal 
services provided to the poor should be in any way different from those provided to 
the rich, ethics precepts thereby proscribe efforts by attorneys to restrict the means 
by which a poor person can be represented. 
As a final ethics prescript, both the Model Rules and the Model Code prohibit 
"conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.,,147 The fair 
administration of justice requires the availability of legal representation and the 
ability of that person's lawyer to make unrestricted decisions about how best to serve 
the client.148 Professors Ted Finman and Theodore Schneyer have argued that the 
proscription on conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice could be 
invoked to prohibit board members of a legal services office from basing client 
representation considerations on the identity of adverse parties or the controversial 
nature of the subject matter.149 A similar argument could be made against members 
of the bar that support restrictions in bar legal assistance programs. 
144 See MODEL RUlES, supra note 69, at R. 2.1, 1.8(t), 5.4(c); MODEL CODE, supra note 
70, at Canon 5. 
145 MODEL RULES, supra note 69, at R. 1.3 cmt. 1. 
146 REsTAlEMENT, supra note 141, § 134 cmt. g. 
147 MODEL RUlES, supra note 69, at R. 8.4(d); MODEL CODE, supra note 70, at DR 
1-102(A)(5). 
148 See MODEL CODE, supra note 70, at EC 8-3 (''The fair administration of justice 
requires the availability of competent lawyers . . . . Those persons unable to pay for legal 
services should be provided needed services."). 
149 Ted Finman & Theodore Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opinions in 
Regulating Lawyer Conduct: A Critique of the Work of the ABA Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility, 29 UCLA L. REv. 67, 135 (1981); see also Leora Harpaz, 
Compelled Lawyer Representation and the Free Speech Rights ofAttorneys, 20 W. NEW ENG. 
L. REv. 49, 58 n.44 (1998) ("An argument can be made that the refusal to represent a client in 
a situation where no other competent attorney is available might impact on the integrity of the 
judicial process."). An attorney may violate this rule even though the conduct does not take 
place in court or affect an ongoing proceeding. CrR. FOR PROF'L REsPONSffill.ITY, ABA, 
ANNOTAlED MODEL RUlES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 614 (5th ed. 2(03). 
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B. Ethics Opinions Condemn Restrictions on Access to Legal Representation 
Ethics opinions repeatedly condemn efforts to restrict the clients or causes that 
legal assistance programs may represent. The earliest relevant ABA opinion 
addressed a proposal by a state law school to develop case acceptance guidelines that 
would help avoid lawsuits against government officials or suits that 'were 
controversial on social or political grounds. In Informal Opinion 1208, the ABA's 
ethics committee held that the lawyer-members of the governing board of a legal aid 
clinic "should seek to avoid establishing guidelines (even though they state only 
broad policies; see Formal Opinion 32415°) that prohibit acceptance of controversial 
clients and cases or that prohibit acceptance of cases aligning the legal aid clinic 
against public officials, governmental agencies or influential members of the 
community."151 Instead, the lawyers "should seek to establish guidelines that 
encourage, not restrict, acceptance of controversial clients and cases, and this is 
particularly true if laymen may be unable otherwise to obtain legal services.,,152 
The ethics committee was particularly concerned that legal aid or volunteer 
lawyer programs are often the last lawyers in town for indigent persons, arguing that 
the "[u]se of guidelines that avoid controversial cases and controversial clients is 
particularly unfortunate if the organization happens to be the only local organization 
providing aid to indigents.,,153 The Supreme Court in Legal Services Corp. v. 
Velazquez also recognized that restrictions on how a lawyer may represent a client 
are more problematic when the client is an indigent person because there often will 
be no alternative source of assistance for interference with constitutional and 
statutory rightS.154 
ABA Formal Opinion 334 addressed efforts to restrict the activities of legal 
services attorneys. The opinion held that activities on behalf of clients "may be 
limited or restricted only to the extent necessary to allocate fairly and reasonably the 
resources of the office and establish proper priorities in the interest of making 
maximum legal services available to the indigent."155 Case priorities "may not be 
150 See infra note 155. 
151 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Infonnal Op. 1208 (1972) (quoting 
MODEL CODE, supra note 70, at EC 2-28, 2-29) (footnote added). "Acceptance of such 
controversial clients and cases by legal aid clinics is in line with the highest aspirations of the 
bar to make legal services available to all." Id. 
152 1d. 
153 1d. 
154 531 U.S. 533, 546 (2001). ''Thus, with respect to the litigation services Congress has 
funded, there is no alternative channel for expression of the advocacy Congress seeks to 
restrict." Id. at 546-47. 
155 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Fonnal Ope 334 (1974) [hereinafter 
Fonnal Op. 334]. Fonnal Opinion 334 clarified and superseded Fonnal Opinion 324, which 
had similarly held that members of a legal services board "should strenuously attempt to fulfill 
their broad obligations under Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by setting 
policies designed to make legal services as fully available to all who need them as resources 
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based on considerations such as the identity of the prospective adverse parties or the 
nature of the remedy ('class action') sought to be employed.,,156 Although limited 
resources may require some allocations of funds, it must be done "fairly and 
reasonably with the objective of making maximum legal services available, within 
the limits of available resources.,,157 Limitations stemming from motives inconsistent 
with the obligation of the bar to make legal services fully available to indigent 
persons "are always improper."158 
Formal Opinion 334 is also important in reiterating that all lawyers, not just 
those serving on a legal aid board, "should use their best efforts to avoid the 
imposition of any unreasonable and unjustified restraints upon the rendition of legal 
services by legal services offices for the benefit of the indigent and should seek to 
remove such restraints where they exist.,,159 ABA Formal Opinion 399, which 
addressed the 1996 congressional restrictions, stated a similar obligation on all 
attomeys.160 It argued that until Congress reverses the restrictions, the legal 
profession must support organizations not funded by LSC where they exist and help 
establish them where they do not. 161 In particular, the opinion calls on lawyers to 
step forward and provide pro bono service to "those whose cases or strategies are 
prohibited" by Congress's LSC restrictions.162 ABA Formal Opinion 347 also 
reiterated the legal profession's "clear responsibility" to take all necessary steps to 
prevent the abandonment of indigent clients that can no longer be served by LSC 
offices. 163 
Amo;ng state and local ethics opinions, a 1996 Utah opinion on the proposed 
LSC restrictions advised that all members of the bar have an ethical duty to assist in 
permit" and "not to reject certain types of clients or particular kinds of cases merely because 
of their controversial nature, anticipated adverse community reaction, or because of a desire to 
avoid alignment against public officials, governmental agencies, or influential merrlbers of the 
community." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Ope 324 (1970) (citing 
MODEL CODE, supra note 70, at EC 2-25, 2-27, 2-28). 
156 Formal Ope 334, supra note 155 (citing MODEL CODE, supra note 70, at EC-l). 
157 Id. Informal Opinion 1359 similarly sanctioned a priority system or other caseload 
limitation only "if it is a fair and reasonable method of making maximum legal services 
available to the indigent and not inconsistent with the Code." ABA Comm. on Ethics and 
Profl Responsibility, Informal Ope 1359 (1976). 
158 Formal Ope 334, supra note 155 
159Id. 
160 Formal Ope 399, supra note 21. 
161 See ide 
162 Id. 
163 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Ope 347 (1981). "If these 
traditional principles of our profession are to be accepted as more than hollow rhetoric, 
lawyers in every jurisdiction acting through the organized bar should take all necessary actions 
to prevent the abandonment of indigent clients." Id. 
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the provision of legal services to persons adversely affected by the restrictions. 164 
The Bar Association of the City of New York, in a lengthy report on the 1996 
congressional restrictions, characterized the limitations on how a lawyer may 
represent a client as "inconsistent with the ethical norms designed to assure the 
quality of those [legal] services ... and inconsistent with our nation's historic 
realization that the autonomy and independence of the Bar is a powerful force for 
securing the rule of law.,,165 The association urged the repeal or invalidation of the 
1996 congressional restrictions. 
C. The Legal Profession's Other Commitments to Equal Access 
Beyond ethics rules and opinions, the organized bar, and in particular the ABA, 
have expressed a strong commitment to providing equal access to legal 
representation. In 2000, the ABA's House of Delegates listed as one of the six core 
values of the legal profession "the lawyer's duty to promote access to justice.,,166 
Similarly, the ABA's widely publicized MacCrate Report on professional 
development identified "Striving to Promote Justice, Fairness, and Morality" as one 
of the profession's four fundamental values. 167 That fundamental value includes 
ensuring that adequate legal services are provided to those unable to pay.168 The 
ABA and the American Association of Law Schools ("AALS") also have recognized 
the duty of lawyers to provide representation to unpopular clients and causes, 
observing that the legal profession "has a clear moral obligation" to ensure their 
representation.169 
Recently, the president of the ABA called for "a recommitment to the noblest 
principles that define our profession: providing legal representation to the poor, 
disadvantaged and underprivileged; and performing public service that enhances the 
common goOd.,,170 Similarly, members of the American Inns of Court pledge to 
164 Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Comm., Ope No. 96-07, 1996 WL 509207, 
at *2 (Aug. 30, 1996). 
165 Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., supra note 21, at 59. 
166 L. Harold Levinson, Collaboration between Lawyers and Others: Coping with the 
ABA Model Rules After Resolution 10F, 36 WAKE FORESTL. REv. 133 app., at 164-65 (2001) 
(citing to resolution 10F, adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in 2000). 
167 SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA, REPORT OF THE TASK 
FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 140 (1992) [hereinafter 
MACCRATE REPORT]. 
168 Id. 
169 Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, supra note 143, at 1217; 
see also Proceedings of the House ofDelegates, 78 A.B.A. ANN. REp. 133 (1953) (reprinting 
an ABA resolution declaring the bar's duty to provide all persons, even the most unpopular 
persons, the benefit of legal representation). 
170 Michael S. Greco, A Renaissance ofIdealism: A Lawyer's Gift ofTime and Expertise 
Can Change a Needy Client's World, A.B.A. J., September 2005, at 6, 6. Among the ABA's 
goals is "to promote meaningful access to legal representation and the American system of 
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"work to make the legal system more accessible, responsive and effective.,,171 State 
bar associations have echoed this commitment to equal access to legal 
representation. 172 
The ABA also contends that lawyers for the poor should provide their clients 
the full range of necessary legal services. The ABA's 2006 Principles of a State 
System for the Delivery of Civil Legal Aid makes clear that civil legal aid should be 
provided to those that "cannot be served through federally funded programs for 
reasons such as their income level, immigration status or because they are 
incarcerated" and that a full range of legal services should be provided to low­
income populations including "extended representation in complex litigation and on 
systemic issues; and representation before state and local legislative and 
administrative bodies.,,173 The ABA's 2002 Standards for Providers of Civil Legal 
Services to the Poor specify that organizations providing civil legal assistance to the 
poor should provide for lobbying before administrative and legislative bodies. 
Standard 5.5 states that "[i]f representation before an administrative body regarding 
adoption of rules . . . is appropriate to achieve client objectives, a legal services 
provider should strive to provide such representation."174 Standard 5.6 similarly 
provides that "[i]f representation before a legislative body is appropriate to achieve 
client objectives, a legal services provider should strive to provide such 
representation,"175 noting that in some situations legislative action may be the most 
justice for all persons regardless of their economic or social condition." ABA, ABA Mission 
and Association Goals, http://www.abanet.org/aboutlgoals.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2006). 
171 American Inns of Court, Professional Creed, http://www.innsofcourt.org/Contentl 
Default.aspx?Id=141 (last visited Nov. 14, 2006). 
172 See, e.g., amo SUP. CT. R. app. V, available at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rules/ 
govbar ("I shall strive to improve the law and our legal system and to make the law and our 
legal system available to al1."); S.C. BAR STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM 2.2 (1999), 
available at http://www.scbar.org/member/documents/professionalism_standards.pdf ("A 
lawyer should provide or assist and defend efforts to provide all persons with just causes, 
regardless of their means or the popularity of their cause, to full and fair access to the law and 
to the judicial system."); The Florida Bar, Ideals and Goals of Professionalism, 
http://www.1aw.stetson.edu/excellence/litethics/flbar.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2006) (stating 
that lawyer professionalism includes contributing one's skill, knowledge and influence as a 
lawyer to "efforts to provide all persons, regardless of their means or popularity of their 
causes, with access to the law and the judicial system"); The Texas Center for Legal Ethics 
and Professionalism, The Texas Lawyer's Creed, A Mandate for Professionalism, 
http://www.txethics.org/reference_creed.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2006) ("I am responsible to 
assure that all persons have access to competent representation regardless of wealth or position 
in life."). 
173 TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE, ABA, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF 
DELEGAlES No. 112B, at 2 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaidl 
downloads/06A112B.pdf. 
174 ABA STANDARDS FOR PROVIDERS, supra note 75, at 17. 
175 [d. 
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efficient, or even the only, means to resolve the client's problem.176 The fact that 
lobbying may be "controversial should not be a barrier to a practitioner pursuing 
it.,,177 The practice restrictions in a number of bar-supported legal assistance 
programs, therefore, are directly contrary to the ABA Standards. 
Thus, the organized bar's position is clear-the legal profession has a duty to 
promote legal representation for all those who cannot afford an attorney, and that 
representation should include the full range of legal services traditionally provided 
by an attorney. 
Lawyer oaths reinforce the obligation to promote equal access to legal 
representation. When the ABA adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics as its fust 
statement of ethical principles in 1908, the organization also adopted a proposed 
oath of admission setting forth the "general principles which should ever control the 
lawyer in the practice of his profession" and "duties which they are sworn on 
admission to obey and for the willful violation of which disbarment is provided.,,178 
Among those seven duties, a lawyer swears to "never reject, from any consideration 
personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed."179 Oaths committing 
attorneys not to reject the cause of the defenseless or oppressed exist today in eleven 
states;180 statutes or court rules in at least eight more states create a similar obligation 
on attorneys.181 Although this duty only constrains the lawyer from personally 
rejecting a defenseless or oppressed person, it reinforces the responsibility of that 
lawyer to avoid assisting in actions that deny legal assistance to unpopular clients or 
causes. 
Judges have a special role in protecting and promoting access to legal 
representation. As the president of the ABA explained: "The Constitution establishes 
the fundamental right of access to the judicial system. The courts, as guardians of 
every person's individual rights, have a special responsibility to protect and enforce 
176 Id. at 94 standard 5.6 cmt. 
177 Id. at 4. 
178 Oath ofAdmission, 33 A.B.A. REp. 584, 584-85 (1908). 
179 Id. at 585. The oath was derived from a similar pledge in the 1850 Field Code, which 
was adopted by at least seventeen states to govern the admission and discipline of lawyers. 
Carol Rice Andrews, Standards ofConduct for lAwyers: An 800-Year Evolution, 57 SMU L. 
REv. 1385, 1424-26, 1440 (2004). 
180 Carol Rice Andrews, Oaths Based on the Field Code Duties (2006) (unpublished 
survey) (on file with author) (identifying oath provisions in Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Michigan, New Mexico, South Carolina, South Dakota, Washington, and 
Wisconsin). 
181 See Robert R. Kuehn, A Normative Analysis of the Rights and Duties of lAw 
Professors to Speak Out, 55 S.C. L. REv. 253, 278 nn.139-40 (2003) (citing to statutory duties 
in Alabama, California, Georgia, Iowa, Minnesota, and Oregon); see also OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, § 
3 (2006); ARIz. SUP. CT. R. 41(h). Violation of an oath or statutory duty is grounds for 
disciplinary action. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6103 (West 2006); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 37-61-301(2)(b) (2006); WASH. REv. CODE § 2.48.220(3) (2006). 
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the right of equal access to the judicial system.,,182 The Conference of Chief Justices, 
which includes the highest judicial officer of each state and the District of Columbia, 
has stated that the promise of equal justice under law is not realized for those with 
no meaningful access to the justice system. I83 The conference resolved that judges 
should develop and support civil legal services for individuals and families without 
access and "take action necessary to ensure access to the justice system for those 
who face impediments they are unable to surmount on their own.,,184 Similarly, the 
American Judges Association has resolved that a major goal of all judges should be 
to provide and protect access to justice for people who are poor, elderly, or who have 
disabilities. 185 
As Judge Judith Billings of the Utah Court of Appeals explained, 'judges have 
a special opportunity, and obligation, to use their positions to provide access to our 
justice system.,,186 Therefore, judges, as guarantors of equal justice, should be 
particularly vigilant in ensuring that no program of the court excludes certain 
182 Robert J. Grey, Jr., Access to the Courts: Equal Justice for All, EJOURNAL USA: 
ISSUES OF DEMOCRACY, August 2004, at 6, 9, http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itdhr/0804/ijde/ 
ijde0804.pdf; see also CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS pmbl. § 2 (1924) ("Courts exist to 
promote justice, and thus to serve the public interest."); Hon. Judith Billings & Jenny M. 
McMahon, Expanding Pro Bono: The Judiciary's Power to Open Doors, DIALOGUE, Spring 
1998, at 1, 1 (''The judiciary has a special responsibility to insure access to justice."). 
183 Conference of Chief Justices, Policy Statements & Resolutions, Resolution 23: 
Leadership to Promote Equal Justice (2001), http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/accesstojusticeresolutions/ 
resoI23Ieadership.html. 
184 Id. The chief justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court has stated that the judicial 
branch is responsible for "offering everyone equal access to justice." Shirley S. Abrahamson, 
Thorny Issues and Slippery Slopes: Perspectives on Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. LJ. 
3, 4 (2003). The executive director of the Vermont Bar Association asserts that "[b]ar 
associations and the judiciary share in the responsibility to insure access to justice." Robert M. 
Paolini, Pro Bono Is Better than Pro Se, VT. BJ. & L. DIG., June 1998, at 7,7. 
185 American Judges Association, Judicial Concerns Resolutions, Resolution on Access 
to Justice and Protection of the Rights of People (Sept. 25, 1997), http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/htdocs/ 
resolutions/aboutaja-resolutions-judicialconcerns.htm. The Honorable John N. Kirkendall, 
past chair of the National Conference of Specialized Court Judges, similarly noted: ''Today, I 
am aware of no serious argument among scholars or others that judges should be exempt from 
participation in improving the profession by continually working toward the goal of making 
available legal services for everyone in our society." John N. Kirkendall, The Judiciary and 
Pro Bono-How May We Help?, 70 MICH. B.J. 912, 912 (1991). 
186 Judith Billings, Using the Judiciary to Promote Pro Bono Activity, DIALOGUE, 
Summer 1997, at 14, 14. Judge Robert McBeth of Washington argues that judges must 
actively promote equal access to legal representation: "Access to justice should be a 
fundamental concern of every judge in the country. We can no longer sit on the sidelines and 
'let the lawyers do their thing'-we need to take positive steps to ensure that our system of 
justice is fair to all participants." Robert E. McBeth, Judicial Activism, JUDGES' J., Winter 
2001, at 12, 13,40. 
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persons or causes from obtaining legal assistance or restricts what a lawyer for the 
poor might do on behalf of her client. 
The final relevant professional norms apply to law school professors. Law 
professors who are members of the bar are subject to the same legal profession 
ethical precepts as other attorneys in the jurisdiction where the professor is admitted, 
even if the professor is not engaged in the active practice of law.187 
Beyond ethics rules, the professional norms of the legal academy promote 
unrestricted access to legal representation. Both the ABA and the AALS argue that 
because law professors function as important role models for law students, they 
should be guided by the highest standards of ethics and professionalism and "should 
assist students to recognize the responsibility of lawyers to advance individual and 
social justice.,,188 The ABA's MacCrate Report reiterated this same responsibility: 
"Law school deans, professors, administrators and staff should be concerned to 
convey to students that the professional value of the need to 'promote justice, 
fairness and morality' is an essential ingredient of the legal profession."189 The 
AALS goes even further, stating that the financial freedom a law professor enjoys 
from not having to serve the interests of private clients creates "an enhanced 
obligation to pursue individual and social justice."190 
187 In re Peters, 428 N.W.2d 375, 380 (Minn. 1988) (rejecting the contention that a law 
professor's ethical obligations and professional responsibilities only apply when representing a 
client); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Ope 336 (1974) (holding that 
a lawyer must comply at all times with the rules of conduct, even if the lawyer is not acting in 
a professional capacity). 
188 AALS, Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors in the Discharge of Their 
Ethical and Professional Responsibilities (2003), in ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW 
SCHOOLS 2006 HANDBOOK 91,92 (2006), available at http://www.aals.org/about_handbook_ 
sgp_eth.php [hereinafter Statement of Good Practices]; see also COMM'N ON 
PROFESSIONAUSM, ABA, " ... IN THE SPIRIT OF PuBuc SERVICE:" A BLUEPRINT FOR THE 
REKINDUNG OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 19 (1986), reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243, 268 
(1987). 
189 MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 167, at 333. "Law school deans, professors, 
administrators and staff must not only promote these values by words, but must so conduct 
themselves as to convey to students that these values are essential ingredients of our 
profession." Id. at 236. ''The sense that professors are uniquely situated to model a 
commitment to justice and the public interest-and their moral obligation to do so--should be 
largely beyond dispute." Thomas D. Morgan, lAw Faculty as Role Models, in TEACHING AND 
LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM: SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS 37, 47 (1996). 
190 Statement of Good Practices, supra note 188. The ABA's law school accreditation 
standards require law schools to establish polices that address a full-time faculty merrlber's 
"[0 ]bligations to the public, including participation in pro bono activities" and to evaluate 
periodically whether faculty members are meeting this obligation. ABA STANDARDS FOR 
APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 404(a)(5), 404(b) (2005), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/chapter4.htm1; see also ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCH., 
PuRSUING EQUAL JUSTICE: LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES 29 (2002), 
available at http://www.aals.org/equaljustice/final_report.pdf ("[L]aw schools and law faculty 
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These heightened professional responsibilities mean that law school 
administrators and professors have an enhanced duty to ensure that their decisions 
on law clinic cases, clients, and methods of representation advance the goal of equal 
access to legal assistance. As the dean of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law 
explained when he rejected pressure from state legislators to exclude controversial 
clients from representation by the school's law clinics: 
The principles of the legal profession are, to me, even more powerful than 
concepts of academic freedom in this instance. The fundamental question 
has been asked throughout this controversy: "What are we teaching law 
students when we decided not to represent people who otherwise would 
not have a voice because of this legislative pressure?,,191 
D. Reasons Profferedfor Restricting Access 
The bar's promotion of or acquiescence to restrictions on equal access to legal 
representation has been explained in three primary ways. However, as shown below, 
none of these reasons are persuasive. 
The first justification is that limited resources require some restrictions on who 
can be served by civil legal assistance programs. Because government and bar­
sponsored programs can only address about one-fifth of the legal needs of the poor, 
this argument asserts that there is no good reason to take on controversial clients like 
undocumented aliens or prisoners. 
The problems with this argument are many. The priorities of legal assistance 
programs should be based on objective, fair assessments of the legal needs of the 
community, the merits of the case, and the likely results. Ethics rules and opinions 
strongly condemn client or case decisions that seek to avoid representing unpopular 
clients or upsetting politicians or other influential community leaders. 192 Yet, it is 
have professional responsibilities to promote equal justice work in their teaching, scholarship, 
and service."). 
191 Terry Carter, Law Clinics Face Critics, A.B.A. J., July 2002, at 24, 26. An AALS 
report echoed this need to act in a way that is consistent with the principles of the legal 
profession: 
If our conduct and actions are inconsistent with the principles and rules that we 
teach, we undermine both our credibility as teachers and the legitimacy of the 
ethical principles and rules themselves. If we appear to -be insincere about our pro 
bono responsibilities, we also will encourage law students to be skeptical, indeed 
cynical, about the many other moral principles that distinguish our profession from 
a trade. 
COMM'N ON PRo BONO & PuB. SERVo OPPORTUNITIES, AALS, LEARNING TO SERVE 18 
(1999). 
192 See supra notes 138-139, 151-158 and accompanying text. 
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clear that Congress's restrictions are based on politics and should not be emulated by 
the legal profession. In fact, some proponents of LSC restrictions justified denying 
representation by arguing that certain poor persons would not be without access to 
attorneys because other public and private entities, such as private attorneys and the 
bar, would fund the representation that the federal government prohibited. 193 Of 
course where the legal profession's legal assistance programs mirror the LSC 
restrictions, the profession is not providing this presumed representation to non­
LSC-eligible clients but is reinforcing the denial of access to legal representation 
sought by LSC's critics. 
In addition, denying assistance to certain unpopular clients or causes serves to 
insulate some laws from judicial review or law breakers from enforcement and 
makes those clients even more vulnerable to infringements of their legal rights. For 
example, in the case of undocumented aliens and prisoners, the failure of the bar to 
provide legal assistance is believed to have exacerbated violations of their legal 
rights and emboldened unscrupulous employers and prison officials to violate the 
law.194 If anything, the unpopularity of the clients or causes should motivate 
individual lawyers and the bar to provide legal assistance since the restrictions in 
federal and state-funded legal assistance programs have made these groups even 
more in need of help. 
A related argument claims that poor people are better served when limited legal 
assistance is focused on the most typical day-to-day legal problems of the poor and 
on individual cases rather than on larger cases or more complex legal problems. Yet, 
the legal profession should be concerned about how best to advance equal access to 
justice and the client's cause. Denying a lawyer for the poor the ability to address the 
client's concerns through lobbying, class actions, or attorneys' fee requests may 
prevent the attorney and client from choosing the best means to achieve the desired 
goal and may result in second-class legal representation for the poor.195 The legal 
profession cannot countenance a restriction on a lawyer's practice that is not based 
on an objective determination of the prospective client's and community's needs and 
of the lawyer's professional judgment about the best way to address those needs. 
193 Abel & Kaufman, supra note 27, at 510 & n.93 (quoting statements by Congressmen 
Robert Doman (R.-Cal.) and Charles Taylor (R.-N.C.»; see also BRENNAN Cm. FOR JUSTICE, 
supra note 93, at 19 (quoting a 1995 pledge from a former LSC president that lawyer pro bono 
efforts "will cushion the termination of federal funding for legal services"); End Legal-Aid 
Program for Poor?-Interview with Edwin Meese III, U.S. NEWS & WORID REp., Aug. 3, 
1981, at 33, 33 (arguing that cutbacks in LSC activities could be offset by expanding law 
school clinical programs). 
194 See supra notes 34, 37 and accompanying text. 
195 Two experts on civil legal assistance for the poor characterized the restriction on the 
kinds of legal work that lawyers can perform as "perhaps even more damaging and insidious" 
than the restrictions on the kinds of cases and clients that legal services offices can handle. 
ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERlE, Cm. FOR LAW & SOC. POllCY, SECURING EQUAL 
JUSTICE FOR AlL: A BRIEF HIsTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STAlES 35 
(2003). 
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The mantra of the legal profession should be that if a lawyer representing a paying 
client is not restrained, then a lawyer for a poor client should not be restrained. 
A third argument in defense of some restrictions is that the bar should avoid 
assisting clients or causes that are "political" or "ideological." Yet, as argued above, 
there is nothing political or ideological about ensuring that legal representation is 
fully available or that both sides of an issue are well represented.196 If it is not 
political for a business to hire an attorney to sue the government over new regulatory 
restrictions, then it is no more political for an undocumented alien to have the ability 
to sue to enforce employment-related rights. As explained by the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, the bar's involvement, and even use of members' dues, in providing 
legal services to the poor is non-ideological. 197 Lawyers simply cannot allow 
Congress, state legislators, or others to define the act of providing a poor person with 
a lawyer as a political or ideological activity.198 
V. CONCLUSION 
The legal profession must move beyond the rhetoric of equal access to legal 
representation. Individual lawyers and judges, along with courts and bar 
associations, must take steps to ensure they are not contributing to the inability of 
some unpopular clients or causes to gain access to legal representation. They must 
also avoid placing restraints on the legal services that lawyers for the poor may 
provide. Indeed, the legal profession must actively seek to ensure that clients 
restricted by Congress or state legislatures are provided access to legal 
representation through the various funding and service programs of the legal 
profession and that lawyers for the indigent are not restricted in ways that do not also 
apply to lawyers representing paying clients. 
The profession should begin by pressing Congress to remove the 1996 
restrictions on clients, causes, and methods of legal representation. These restrictions 
were the result of politics and enacted to appease special interests hostile to legal 
assistance to the poor. They do not comport with the legal profession's position that 
allocations of limited resources must be done fairly and reasonably. Professor David 
Luban argues that "neither the Bar nor legal-services establishments offered any 
organized protest when the 1996 restrictions were enacted-unlike a similar assault 
in 1981, when law school deans and the organized bar united in protest against 
196 See supra text accompanying notes 47, 140-143. This is particularly true in the case 
of programs, such as those developed and operated by the legal profession, that are not 
financed by taxpayer funds. 
197 See In re Petition of the Wis. Trust Account Found., Inc., 2005 WI 35, 277 Wis. 2d 
xiii, xvi (2005). 
198 Professor David Luban has extensively addressed the attack on the LSC and the 
contention that lawyers for the poor "practice politics, not law" in DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS 
AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STIJDY 293-391 (1988). 
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efforts to abolish the LSC.,,199 The bar claims it was active in 1996, saving LSC from 
being abolished.2°O However, even if the bar's past efforts were significant, 
prominent members of the legal profession and the organized bar must consistently 
and strongly press Congress to abolish those restrictions. 
This is not to imply naively that rolling back restrictions will be easy, given the 
enmity of some members of Congress and certain special interest groups toward 
many legal aid cases and methods. However, at the very least, the legal profession 
should press for changes that would allow recipients of LSC funding to be able again 
to use non-LSC funds to engage in restricted activities. Prohibiting the primary LSC­
funded legal services organizations in a state from using non-LSC funds for any 
prohibited purpose and applying the restrictions to other entities that receive 
transfers of LSC funds have left many states with no provider able to serve restricted 
clients.201 Alan Houseman argued: 
[T]hose who care about equal justice for the poor must take whatever steps 
, possible to remove restrictions on which clients can be served and what 
legal services can be provided. Perhaps the most pernicious is the 
restriction on the use of non-LSC funds by LSC-funded recipients, which 
dries up funding sources that have in the past and would have in the future 
provided resources to serve the critical legal problems of low-income 
clients.202 
The legal profession's goal of removing congressional restraints on equal access to 
legal representation could begin, therefore, with an effort to return to the pre-1996 
rules on use of non-LSC funds. 
The legal profession should similarly use its influence to convince state 
legislatures to remove existing civil legal assistance funding restrictions and not to 
adopt any new restrictions that have the effect of denying access to representation to 
some groups or limiting the legal services they can receive. At the very least, where 
legislatures seem unwilling to remove all restrictions on class actions or lobbying, 
they should be pressed to impose only the conditions on legal services that existed 
prior to the 1996 congressional restrictions. Thus, class actions could be pursued 
where the case is first approved by the governing board of the grantee, and lobbying 
199 Luban, supra note 12, at 225. 
200 ABA, PROMOTING PROFESSIONAUSM 64 (1998) ("Since 1995, the ABA working with 
state and local bars, created and guided a national grassroots network reaching more than 
100,000 lawyers to fight for the preservation of the Legal Services Corporation. These efforts 
have resulted in strong, bipartisan votes in both Houses of Congress to preserve the 
Corporation and its funding."). 
201 Abel & Udell, supra note 27, at 880 n.26; see supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
Note, however, that with transfers of LSC funds for the sole purpose of funding private 
attorney involvement activities, the restrictions only apply to the LSC funds transferred. See 
supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
202 Houseman, supra note 25, at 2188 n.8. 
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would be allowed where the attorney determined it was necessary for the proper 
representation of a particular client. Even many objections to attorneys' fees could 
be ameliorated by directing that any awards be placed into the state's legal assistance 
fund and distributed broadly, rather than awarded to the office of the attorney 
handling the case. 
Restrictions in judge- and lawyer-sponsored or controlled legal assistance 
funding and volunteer service programs also should be abolished. With these 
programs, the profession has no one to blame for the restrictions other than its own 
acquiescence to efforts to deny access to legal representation or ignorance of the 
effects of its program decisions. As Part IV of this Article established, the politics, 
interest group pressure, and hostile public sentiment that have driven Congress and 
state legislatures to restrict legal services should play no role, either knowingly or 
unwittingly, in the legal profession's decisions on eligibility for free legal 
representation. Those decisions must strive for universal access. Where limited 
resources prevent that ideal, the profession must allocate available funds and 
volunteers through objective decisions motivated by a desire for equal access to legal 
representation and reflective of need, merit, and likely benefits. 
The legal profession's funding and volunteer lawyer program decisions must be 
conscious of the effect that congressional and other restrictions are having on the 
goal of equal access to legal representation in that particular state. Some states have 
done legal needs studies that have helped identify the restricted groups, sometimes 
referred to as "gap clients," excluded from funding by LSC restrictions.203 Those 
states have then sought to ensure that decisions on how to distribute scarce legal 
resources take into account and seek to address these gap clients.204 The legal 
profession too should direct its attention and resources to making sure gap clients 
have equal access to available legal resources. 
On the issue of class actions, lobbying, and other restrictions on methods of 
representation, with the increased devolution of government social service programs 
from the federal government to the state, "state level advocacy has become essential 
to ensuring that the rights and interests of low-income persons are protected and 
enhanced.,,205 A study by Alan Houseman concluded that successful advocacy for 
poor persons required that each state have "a capacity independent of LSC funded 
203 See, e.g., ALASKA REPORT, supra note 62, at 19-22; Abel & Udell, supra note 27, at 
875 n.3, 880 n.26 (listing state reports in Alaska, California, Georgia, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, and Texas that identify gaps in access to legal services caused by the 
congressional restrictions). 
204 See, e.g., WASH. STAlE ACCESS TO JUSTICE Bo., PLAN FOR THE DELIVERY OF CWIL 
LEGAL AID TO Low INCOME PEoPLE IN WASHlNGTON STAlE 6, 22-24 (2006), available at 
http://www.wsba.org/atj/committees/2006stateplan.pdf; Memorandum from Jamie L. Mack, 
Ga. Access to Justice Project, to All Attendees of the Closing the Gap Symposium (Sept. 23, 
1998) (on file with author). 
205 ALAN W. HOUSEMAN, ClR. FOR LAW & SOC. POllCY, THE MISSlNG LINK IN JUSTICE 
COMMUNITIES: THE CAPACITY IN EACH STAlE FOR STAlE LEVEL ADVOCACY, COORDlNATION 
AND SUPPORT 7 (2001). 
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providers to engage in restricted representation that cannot be undertaken by LSC 
funded providers" through statewide advocacy, including representation before 
legislative and administrative bodies.206 The ABA's standards for civil legal 
assistance programs seek to address this need, in part, by directing that programs 
provide for lobbying and class action representation.207 Thus, the legal profession's 
efforts to expand legal assistance should address this need for unrestricted advocacy, 
especially in states where there is little or no legal assistance funding unencumbered 
by LSC restrictions?08 
The legal profession must cease to be an accomplice in efforts to provide 
"liberty and justice for some." The profession cannot paradoxically proclaim its 
commitment to access to legal representation and yet subvert that very goal by 
imposing restrictions on unpopular clients or types of legal services. If the principles 
of the legal profession mean anything, then all lawyers, courts, and bar organizations 
need to fight to ensure access to justice is truly equal and without restrictions. 
206 Id. at 1, 7.
 
207 See supra notes 173-177 and accompanying text.
 
208 "State justice communities also must ensure that a capacity exists to provide
 
representation on restricted cases and for clients who cannot be represented by LSC-funded 
providers." HOUSEMAN, supra note 205, at 8. 
